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The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) is the pri-
mary federal statute regulating the management of "hazardous wastes."
Although frequently characterized as regulating wastes from "cradle to
grave,"' 2 this expression obscures a critical aspect of the statute. RCRA
is not a comprehensive statute that covers all hazardous substances.
Rather, the Subtitle C regulatory system applies only to hazardous "solid
wastes," and under the crucial language of the statute, its regulatory
reach extends only to materials that have been "discarded." ' 3 In fact,
RCRA is a "deathbed to grave" statute, and one of the most difficult
issues is determining when death has occurred.
The limitation of RCRA's coverage to "solid wastes" that have been
"discarded" raises difficult questions concerning the scope of the statute.
Some materials that might otherwise be "discarded" as wastes may be
reused in a variety of ways that have commercial value. Are these recy-
clable materials subject to regulation as "wastes" under RCRA?4 If so,
how stringently should they be regulated?
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1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
2. H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6238, 6242. According to the report, RCRA would "eliminate the last remain-
ing loophole in environmental law, that of unregulated land disposal of discarded materials
and hazardous waste" by regulating these materials "from the point of generation, through
transportation, storage, treatment and disposal." Id. at 4-5.
3. Id. at 2-3.
4. This Article generally refers to recyclable rather than recycled materials. EPA does
not in most cases regulate final "recycled" products made from wastes. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.3(c)(2)(i) (1988). The issue is generally limited to whether "recyclable" materials, those
materials that may be reused or recycled, are wastes. See infra text accompanying notes 106-
07.
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These questions highlight a basic conflict that makes regulating re-
cyclable materials particularly difficult. On the one hand, recycling and
resource conservation are clear objectives of RCRA.5 Putting materials
that otherwise would be discarded to commercial use decreases the
problems associated with their final disposal. Diminishing landfill capac-
ity and rising disposal costs increase the importance of recycling. 6 Re-
cycling processes, however, create many of the same environmental
hazards posed by improper disposal. Indeed, some types of so-called re-
cycling, such as burning wastes for fuel or applying waste as a dust sup-
pressant, may be disguised forms of incineration and land disposal-
means of disposal strictly regulated under RCRA.7 Excluding such "re-
cycling" from regulation would create a potentially enormous and envi-
ronmentally dangerous loophole in RCRA's coverage.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the agency responsi-
ble for implementing RCRA, has attempted to resolve these conflicting
objectives through its definition of "solid waste" under RCRA. In Janu-
ary 1985, EPA adopted an extremely complicated and confusing defini-
tion of "solid waste"8 that draws the finest of distinctions between types
of materials and the means used to recycle them. The definition, one
suspects, leaves virtually everyone involved with recycling confused over
the scope and logic of RCRA's regulatory framework.
To add to the confusion, in 1987 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit invalidated EPA's definition of solid waste.
The court's holding in American Mining Congress v. EPA9 was based on
the simplistic and singularly unhelpful conclusion that Congress in-
tended RCRA to apply to materials that really have been "discarded"
according to the common meaning of the word.' 0
This Article analyzes RCRA's applicability to recyclable materials
and EPA's regulatory approach to the issue. Part I describes the special
problems that regulation of recyclable materials presents under RCRA.
These problems arise not only from the complexity and variety of re-
cycling but also from the basic structure of RCRA. Part II describes
EPA's definition of solid waste and the regulatory provisions applicable
to recyclable materials. Part III evaluates the court's treatment of the
problem in American Mining Congress and EPA's response. Part IV of-
5. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(7) (1982).
6. See Halgren, Recycling and Resource Recovery: State and Municipal Legal Impedi-
ments, 7 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1980); Note, Legal Incentives for Reduction, Reuse, and
Recycling: A New Approach to Hazardous Waste Management, 95 YALE L.J. 810 (1986).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 69 24(q)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
8. Hazardous Waste Management System; Definition of Solid Waste, 50 Fed. Reg. 614
(1985) (final rule) [hereinafter Original Definition].
9. 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
10. Id.
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fers some suggestions on how EPA should treat recyclable materials
under RCRA.
The Article concludes that, despite the complexity of its regulations,
EPA's basic approach is a sound, thoughtful response to an extremely
difficult problem. The Article argues, however, that EPA can improve
its existing regulations in three ways. First, EPA must articulate more
clearly the rationale underlying its definition of solid waste. Second, the
Agency should reconsider its regulation of certain types of recycling in
light of controls that are available under other environmental statutes.
Finally, EPA should redraft its regulations to clarify and simplify them.
I
THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF RECYCLABLE MATERIALS
UNDER RCRA
Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act is a com-
prehensive program for managing the disposal of hazardous solid
waste."I The key to determining the applicability of these provisions is
RCRA's definition of solid waste. Under RCRA, hazardous wastes are a
subset of solid wastes, 12 and only materials that are classified first as solid
wastes are subject to regulation.13 RCRA defines solid waste as
any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply
treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded ma-
terial, including solid, liquid, semisolid or contained gaseous material,
resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural opera-
tions and from community activities .... 14
Solid waste that either exhibits a hazardous "characteristic," such as
ignitability or toxicity, or has been "listed" as hazardous by EPA is clas-
sified as a hazardous waste.15 The consequences of being classified as a
il. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939b (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
12. Id. § 6903.
13. Id. § 6921. Unfortunately, even this seemingly simple point is not straightforward
when dealing with EPA's definition of solid waste. Under the EPA regulations governing the
identification and listing of hazardous waste, the definition of solid waste applies only to mater-
ials defined as hazardous. See infra note 63.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1982).
15. Id. § 6921. A material that is a solid waste may be classified as a hazardous waste on
one of two bases. First, a waste may be hazardous if it exhibits certain hazardous characteris-
tics established by EPA, including reactivity (i.e., explosive), corrosivity (i.e., acidic),
ignitability (i.e., flammable), or toxicity under EPA test protocols. See 40 C.FR. §§ 261.20-
.24 (1988). A generator is responsible for determining if its waste exhibits a hazardous charac-
teristic. See id. § 262.1 1(c). Second, a waste may also be classified as hazardous if it has been
specifically listed as such by EPA. See id. § 261.11. Particular types of wastes from industrial
processes have been designated as listed wastes. See id. §§ 261.30-.33. A generator need only
determine if its waste is on the list to know if the waste is hazardous. See generally id.
§ 260.1 l(b). A generator, however, may petition to have wastes from its particular facility
"'delisted'" from the Agency's industry specific hazardous waste list. See id, § 260.22.
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hazardous solid waste are significant: hazardous wastes are subject to a
complex and potentially costly set of regulatory requirements.' 6
Because the RCRA Subtitle C program applies only to "wastes," the
problem of recyclable materials is apparent. Recyclable materials are not
in an obvious sense wastes; they are still within the stream of com-
merce. 17 Although commercial materials may be hazardous and raise
environmental concerns, they are not regulated under RCRA. Other en-
16. Subtitle C, containing the so-called "cradle to grave" provisions, establishes regula-
tion over generators, transporters, and those who treat, store, or dispose of hazardous wastes.
42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939b (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). RCRA was originally adopted by Congress
in 1976, but EPA, for a variety of reasons, failed to promulgate adequate regulations imple-
menting the statute until 1982. In 1984, Congress responded to perceived inadequacies in
EPA's handling of RCRA by amending the statute to impose potentially very stringent re-
quirements on the disposal of hazardous wastes. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (codified principally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939b (1982
& Supp. IV 1986)).
Subtitle C of RCRA is not simple, but an understanding of the provisions dealing with
recyclable materials requires some understanding of the overall structure of the hazardous
waste provisions of RCRA. For a general discussion of the requirements of Subtitle C, see 2
ENVTL. L. INST., LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION §§ 13.01-.03 (S. Novick ed. 1987);
R. FORTUNA & D. LENNET, HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATION, THE NEW ERA: AN ANAL-
YSIS AND GUIDE TO RCRA AND THE 1984 AMENDMENTS (1987); J. QUARLES, FEDERAL
REGULATION OF HAZARDOUS WASTES: A GUIDE 1-12 (1982). The following paragraphs
outline the regulatory provisions of Subtitle C.
Generator Requirements. Under section 3002 of RCRA, generators of hazardous waste
are subject to certain limited obligations, including proper storage, record keeping, and report-
ing. If wastes are disposed of offsite, the generator is also responsible for preparing a manifest
that describes the waste and accompanies the waste during transportation. If the generator
does not receive a copy of the manifest from the final disposal site within a certain period, it is
required to notify EPA. If a generator decides to dispose of its wastes onsite, it is subject to the
requirements applicable to a disposal facility. See Standards Applicable to Generators of Haz-
ardous Waste, 40 C.F.R. Part 262 (1988).
Transporter Requirements. Section 3003 of RCRA establishes labeling and reporting re-
quirements for transporters. The most significant substantive requirements are the obligations
to take the waste only to an approved disposal site and to ensure that the manifest accompa-
nies the shipment. See Standards Applicable to Transporters of Hazardous Waste, id. at Part
263.
TSDF Permit Requirements. Sections 3004 and 3005 set forth the requirements for haz-
ardous waste disposal sites called "treatment, storage, or disposal facilities" or "TSDF's," sub-
jecting them to a federally defined permit program. Although EPA initially was responsible
for issuing TSDF permits, states with programs meeting EPA criteria may administer the
program.
TSDF permit requirements are the most difficult and costly consequence of recycling haz-
ardous wastes. See Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Stor-
age and Disposal Facilities, id. at Part 264. EPA regulations impose a basic set of
requirements on all facilities that either treat, store, or dispose of hazardous wastes. The most
important of these are financial responsibility requirements (ensuring that the facility will have
adequate financial resources to close properly and to compensate any victims of a spill or
release), id. §§ 264.140-.151, preparedness planning, id. §§ 264.30-.37, and reporting and re-
cordkeeping obligations, id. §§ 264.70-.77. Facilities that dispose of wastes by landfilling or
incineration are subject to stringent limitations and controls. EPA has imposed a variety of
these substantive requirements on facilities that recycle hazardous wastes. For a discussion of
these requirements, see infra notes 131-42 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
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vironmental statutes, including the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund),18 the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 19 and the
Toxic Substance Control Act,20 regulate hazardous substances regardless
of whether they are "wastes." '21
EPA has wrestled for over ten years with the problem of distin-
guishing between recyclable materials that are RCRA wastes and those
that are commercial products and, thus, not subject to regulation. 22 In
part, the problem arises because an adequate regulatory program must
deal with a wide variety of existing and potential recycling activities.
More fundamentally, the basic structure and objectives of RCRA create
special problems in determining the proper regulatory approach to re-
cyclable materials.
A. The Variety of Recycling Activities
The first source of EPA's difficulty in developing a regulatory pro-
gram for recyclable materials lies in the enormous variety of types of
recycling activities.2 3 At a minimum, recycling means using a material
for some commercial purpose when the material would otherwise be dis-
carded. The concept encompasses activities with a variety of both posi-
tive and negative environmental consequences. Consider the following
examples of industrial operations:24
Toxic metal-containing sludges from the chemical industry go
through a reclamation process that results in a soil-like solid that can be
used for landfill cover material. Are the sludges solid wastes? 25
Non-halogenated spent solvents (heavy alcohol, ketones, hydrocar-
bons, and heavy residuals) from a chemical manufacturing plant are
physically mixed into a product that is sold as marine fuel. Are the spent
solvents solid waste?26
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (Supp. IV 1986).
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
21. See infra notes 248-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of these statutes and
their significance to EPA's regulation of recyclable materials.
22. See Original Definition, supra note 8, at 617.
23. See generally Garelick, EPA's Definition of Solid Waste: Making Distinctions between
Shades of Gray, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,349 (1987); INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS,
INC., GUIDANCE MANUAL ON THE RCRA REGULATION OF RECYCLED HAZARDOUS
WASTES (Mar. 1986) [hereinafter RCRA GUIDANCE MANUAL] (prepared for U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste).
24. These examples are taken from a guidance manual on the definition of solid waste
prepared for EPA. RCRA GUIDANCE MANUAL, supra note 23.
25. Id. at 2-7 to 2-8. Under EPA regulation the sludges are wastes because they are
placed on the land, which is defined as use constituting disposal.




Spent chromic acid from metal finishing plating baths is neutralized
and goes through an ion exchange process that removes the chromium.
The acid is regenerated and returned to the metal finishing plating bath.
The ion exchange resin is treated with sodium hydroxide to remove any
impurities and the resin is then returned to the ion exchange column. Is
the contaminated ion exchange resin a solid waste?27
Spent toluene that was used as a solvent in a manufacturing process
is absorbed in an on-site carbon absorption system. After the absorption
and desorption process, the solvent is decanted from water and reused in
the original process. What is the status of the spent toluene?28
Amorphous polypropylene residues go through a processor that ex-
tracts residual solvents for reuse as degreasers. The polymeric residues
are blended with asphaltic materials to make a more crack-resistant
asphalt for sale. What is the status of the asphalt?29
Clearly, coming up with a single regulatory definition that encom-
passes the almost limitless variety of recycling activities is not simple.
But, as diverse as these activities may appear, they can be categorized
under certain common recycling methods.
1. Direct Use of a Material as a Product
Materials that are byproducts of an industrial process may have in-
cidental uses as commercial products. A prime example, and perhaps the
paradigm case of a mismanaged hazardous waste, was the direct use of
waste oil contaminated with dioxin as a dust suppressant on dirt roads in
Times Beach, Missouri. 30 More commonly, waste oils are burned for
their energy content in residential or industrial boilers. Such uses may be
thought of as direct commercial uses. Additionally, recyclable materials
may directly replace commercial chemical products in industrial opera-
tions. For example, some acid wastes are used to neutralize corrosive
materials.
2. Use of a Material as an Ingredient
Recycling also may involve the use of a material as an ingredient in
the production of a commercial product. Bottom ash, for example, can
be used as an ingredient in cement. Distillation bottoms from the manu-
27. Id. at 2-52 to 2-53. If the spent chromic acid is a "listed" waste, then it is a waste
until it is regenerated. After it is regenerated, the regenerated acid becomes a product and not
a waste.
28. Id. at 2-54 to 2-55. The spent toluene is a solid waste because it is being reclaimed.
29. Id. at 2-236 to 2-237. If the polyproplylene residues are hazardous solely because
they exhibit a hazardous characteristic, and if the asphalt does not exhibit a hazardous charac-
teristic, the asphalt is not a hazardous waste.
30. Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 811 F.2d 1180, 1182 n.1
(8th Cir. 1987) (describing the cleanup of Times Beach); Hall, Health Risksfrom Exposure to
Hazardous Wastes, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,118 (1984); Reinhold, Missouri Di-
oxin Cleanup: A Decade of Little Action, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
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facture of carbon tetrachloride may be used in the production of
tetrachloroethylene. 31
3. Reclamation of Usable Materials
Recycling by reclaiming usable materials can range from the reuse
of aluminum cans to the recovery of lead from old batteries. Similarly,
reclamation can involve the regeneration for reuse of a contaminated ma-
terial. Spent solvents, for example, can be reclaimed by removing
contaminants. 32
4. Continued Processing of Materials
Finally, recycling also may be thought of as the continued process-
ing of materials. Petroleum refining, for example, involves the serial
treatment of hydrocarbons through various thermal or catalytic
processes through which "waste" oils are returned to the system for fur-
ther processing. 33
Although diversity of recycling may complicate the problem of reg-
ulation, this diversity is something that is to be encouraged. Novel, pro-
ductive, and safe reuse of wastes is a goal of RCRA. 34 The difficulty lies
in distinguishing recycling processes that involve the commercial reuse of
waste materials and those that are simply a "sham" to avoid the expense
of proper disposal and treatment of hazardous wastes. EPA purports to
distinguish legitimate from "sham" recycling operations, but making
these distinctions can be quite controversial. 35
B. The Structure and Objectives of RCRA
Although the diversity of recycling methods makes development of
a single regulatory definition of solid wastes difficult, the structure and
objectives of RCRA present even more fundamental problems in fashion-
ing a rational definition and regulatory program for recyclable hazardous
wastes. The biggest problems arise from the jurisdictional scope of
RCRA. Although RCRA applies only to hazardous "wastes," there
may be no rational basis for distinguishing hazardous recyclable wastes
31. See Original Definition, supra note 8, at 619.
32. Id. at 624.
33. Id at 614-24.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
35. See infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text for a discussion of EPA's criteria for
determining "sham" recycling. The problem of distinguishing legitimate from "sham" re-
cycling is reflected in the controversy surrounding the Marine Shale Processors, Inc. opera-
tions in Louisiana. This facility purports to recycle wastes by burning hazardous waste and
incorporating the ash into an aggregate to be sold as a product. The Senate has undertaken
hearings, in response to complaints by the Hazardous Waste Treatment Council and others, to
investigate whether Marine Shale's operations constitute "sham" recycling. See 18 Env't Rptr.
(BNA) 2523 (Apr. 22, 1988).
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from other hazardous materials. Problems also arise from RCRA's con-
flicting objectives of encouraging recycling and protecting human health
and the environment from improper hazardous waste management.
EPA walks a fine line in regulating recycling to ensure that it is ade-
quately controlled but not unduly constrained.
1. Applicability of RCRA to Recyclable Materials
Because recyclable materials are reused in commerce, some have ar-
gued that the materials have not been "discarded" and therefore are not
subject to Subtitle C regulatory controls. 36 EPA, however, has not been
willing to give a blanket exclusion for all "recycled" materials. More-
over, it has consistently asserted its authority to regulate some materials
that are recycled. 37
The statute and its legislative history clearly show that some re-
cycling was meant to be subject to regulation. RCRA itself states that it
is intended to regulate "hazardous waste management" which, by statu-
tory definition, includes the recycling practices of source separation and
recovery. 38 A variety of other provisions of RCRA also apply to the
recycling of materials that are classified as "solid waste."'39
The legislative history of RCRA also indicates that Congress in-
tended that some recyclable materials be classified as waste. 4° Approxi-
mately one-third of the damage incidents identified by Congress as the
rationale for adopting RCRA involved the mismanagement of recyclable
materials. 41 Additionally, the legislative history of the 1984 Hazardous
36. See Hazardous Waste Management System: General; Indentification and Listing of
Hazardous Waste; Standards Applicable to Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treat-
ment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities; Interim Status Standards for Owners and Operators of
Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage and Disposal Facilities; and Standards for the Manage-
ment of Specific Wastes and Managment Standards for Specific Types of Facilities, 48 Fed.
Reg. 14,472, 14,502 (1983) (proposed rules) [hereinafter Proposed Standards].
37. In an appendix to its 1983 proposal, EPA presented an extended analysis of its claim
that RCRA provided authority to regulate some forms of recycling. Id. In the preamble to
the 1985 regulation, EPA restated this position. Original Definition, supra note 8, at 616.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
39. Id. § 6903(7). In the appendix to its 1983 proposal, EPA also noted that the terms
"resource recovery," "resource recovery facility," "resource recovery system," and "recovered
resources" all involve the recovery of products from solid waste, thus implying to the Agency
that materials remain solid wastes subject to RCRA jurisdiction even when recycled through
resource recovery. Proposed Standards, supra note 36, at 14,502.
The court in American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1187 n.14 (D.C. Cir.
1987), was unimpressed by provisions of RCRA that referred to the recycling of "solid waste."
The court implied that these sections begged the question since on their face they only applied
to solid waste. The court termed this the "circularity" problem. Id. at 1188. Although the
court is certainly correct that these provisions do not establish that all recyclable materials are
wastes, they certainly imply that recyclable materials may be wastes. Thus, they refute the
argument that a material, if recycled, cannot be a RCRA waste.
40. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 2, at 1-25.
41. See id. at 18, 22; Appendix B: Summary of Damage Incidents Resulting from Re-
cycling of Hazardous Wastes, Proposed Standards, supra note 36, at 14,505-07. But see Ameri-
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and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) clearly indicates that at least
some in Congress believed RCRA provided authority to regulate some
recyclable materials. 42 Furthermore, by its own terms, HSWA requires
EPA to establish a regulatory program for hazardous wastes burned for
energy recovery. 43 It also specifically prohibits the use of hazardous
waste for dust suppression or road treatment. 44
Although this evidence suggests that some recyclable materials may
be regulated as solid waste under RCRA,45 it does little to resolve the
basic question of how to distinguish recyclable "wastes" that should be
regulated from products that are not wastes at all. In fact, it creates a
difficult dilemma for EPA. Because Congress authorized EPA to regu-
late some recyclable materials under RCRA, EPA cannot avoid using a
definition of solid wastes that includes materials that are not, in any obvi-
ous sense, discarded.
This problem also points to another fundamental dilemma in the
structure of RCRA. Although it is clear that RCRA does not apply to
"virgin" or raw materials used as commercial products, there is little
environmental basis for distinguishing between the management of raw
materials and the management of recyclable materials. The use, han-
dling, and storage of both recyclable and raw materials have caused envi-
ronmental harms. Nonetheless, EPA is required to distinguish between
them for purposes of RCRA. Since both may pose similar environmental
harms, however, EPA may not draw a line between wastes and products
that relies exclusively on environmental concerns.46 Ultimately, EPA is
faced with a dilemma because using the classification of "waste" as the
can Mining Congress, 824 F.2d at 1191.
42. In stating its rationale for a provision requiring EPA to regulate the burning of haz-
ardous wastes for fuel, the Report of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce affirmed
that:
RCRA already provides regulatory authority over these activities (which authority
the Agency has exercised to a limited degree) and in this provision [the Committee]
is... clarify[ing] that materials being used, reused, recycled, or reclaimed can indeed
be solid and hazardous wastes and that these various recycling activities may consti-
tute hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal.
H.R. REP. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1984).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(q)-(r) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see infra notes 164-71 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the court's analysis of these sections.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(l) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
45. EPA also has noted that courts have upheld the applicability of RCRA to recycling
facilities under the "imminent hazard" enforcement provisions of RCRA and in authorizing
guidelines for returnable beverage containers. See Proposed Standards, supra note 36, at
14,502-03.
46. In the preamble to its regulatory definition of solid waste, EPA noted: "We also do
not accept the argument that a potentially harmful recycling practice is invariably subject to
regulation under Subtitle C, since potential environmental harm is not always a determinative
indicator of how closely a recycling activity resembles hazardous waste management." Origi-
nal Definition, supra note 8, at 617.
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regulatory dividing line makes little sense when dealing with recyclable
materials.
2. Inconsistent Objectives of RCRA
In addition to the uncertainty of RCRA's scope, another problem in
defining a regulatory program for recyclable materials arises from
RCRA's potentially inconsistent objectives with regard to recycling.
Congress clearly intended RCRA to encourage recycling both to con-
serve resources and to reduce the volume and hence the problem of haz-
ardous wastes. One explicit objective of RCRA is to minimize "the
generation of hazardous waste and the land disposal of hazardous waste
by encouraging process substitution, materials recovery, properly con-
ducted recycling and reuse and treatment. ' 47 Indeed, the statute's very
name emphasizes its objectives of resource conservation and recovery.
Although Congress intended RCRA to encourage recycling in pref-
erence to disposal, the statute speaks of encouraging only "properly con-
ducted" recycling activities. 48 Indeed, the basic aim of the statute is the
"protection of human health and the environment, ' 49 and EPA has
stated that encouraging recycling is secondary to environmental protec-
tion.50 Thus, the Agency must ensure that there are adequate environ-
mental controls on recycling activities, while not discouraging the
development of recycling as an alternative to disposal of wastes.51
II
EPA'S TREATMENT OF RECYCLABLE MATERIALS
EPA's attempt to define "solid wastes" for purposes of identifying
which recyclable materials and recycling processes should be regulated
47. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(6) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 6902(a).
50. The preamble to the 1985 regulation states: "[T]he Agency is guided by the principle
that the paramount and overriding statutory objective of RCRA is protection of human health
and the environment. The statutory policy of encouraging recycling is secondary and must
give way if it is in conflict with the principal objective." Original Definition, supra note 8, at
618.
51. EPA's obligation to balance environmental protection and recycling is unclear. The
statute does not expressly provide for such balancing. Many of the substantive provisions of
RCRA provide as the basic statutory standard "the protection of human health and the envi-
ronment." See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a), (n) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The provisions of
HSWA that deal with the recycling of petroleum products also state that EPA is to adopt
regulations "as may be necessary to protect human health and the environment." Id.
§ 6 9 2 4 (q). Only section 3014, which deals with restrictions on recycled oil, specifically re-
quires EPA to ensure that its regulations do not discourage the recycling of used oil consistent
with protection of human health and the environment. Id. § 6935(a).
Nonetheless, the statute does state that its objectives are both to protect the environment
and to encourage recycling. EPA has implicitly recognized that both objectives are to be ad-
vanced even if encouraging recycling is to be given secondary importance. See supra note 50.
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has been long and, apparently, painful. 5 2 Although RCRA was adopted
in 1976, EPA did not promulgate its first definition of solid waste until
May 1980. 5 3 This first definition was interesting. On the one hand, it
asserted an extremely broad jurisdiction over recycled materials, encom-
passing all materials that were "sometimes" discarded.5 4 Recyclable
materials, if discarded by some, were treated as solid waste for all. On
the other hand, EPA imposed only limited regulatory requirements on
these materials. 55
This broad definition was challenged in court,56 and EPA began ne-
gotiating with the parties to develop a revised definition of solid waste. 57
On April 4, 1983, EPA proposed revisions to the initial definition, setting
out a complex scheme that classified certain materials and recycling
methods as creating solid wastes, according to the nature of the material
and the manner of recycling. 58
On January 4, 1985, EPA promulgated its current revised final regu-
lations.5 9 The final regulations adopt the basic approach of the 1983 pro-
posal by defining a material as a "solid waste" if it is both within a
specified group of "secondary materials" and is being "reused or re-
cycled" in specified ways, generally corresponding to hazardous waste
disposal, storage, or treatment. 60 Through this definition, EPA is at-
tempting to assert jurisdiction over recyclable wastes while excluding re-
cycling activities that are "very similar to normal production operations
or normal uses of commercial products." '6'
As the preamble to the 1985 regulation states: "It is evident that the
Agency is adopting a complicated regulatory scheme."'62 As always,
EPA remains the master of understatement. The current definition is
one of the most convoluted and complex regulations in a field known for
52. See generally J. QUARLES, supra note 16, at 51-66.
53. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(b) (1988).
54. The regulation adopted in May 1980 defined solid waste to include "any other dis-
carded material" that: (1) is discarded or is being accumulated, stored, or treated (physically,
chemically, or biologically) prior to being discarded; or (2) has served its original intended use
and sometimes is discarded; or (3) is a manufacturing or mining byproduct and sometimes is
discarded. Id.
55. In describing its 1980 regulation, EPA wrote: -[T]he existing regulations establish
broad jurisdiction over recycled materials and recycling operations, although this is tempered
by regulating quite narrowly." Proposed Standards, supra note 36, at 14,475.
56. Id. at 14,475 n.4.
57. See id. Although the final definition was substantially influenced by the negotiations,
the parties to the negotiation never reached final agreement.
58. Id. at 14,473.
59. Original Definition, supra note 8, at 614. The regulations retain the basis of the pro-
posal but significantly alter the classifications and treatment of specific wastes. See id. at 616.
60. Id. at 618.
61. Id. at 617. See infra notes 212-24 and accompanying text for an analysis of EPA's
rationale for classification of materials as solid waste.
62. Original Definition, supra note 8, at 617.
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confusing regulations. Barbers wish that they could split hairs as finely
as the Agency does.
To understand EPA's treatment of recyclable materials, it is impor-
tant to recognize that the regulations first include within the definition of
solid waste a specified group of secondary materials recycled or reused in
specified ways. The regulations then exclude, through a series of exemp-
tions, exclusions, and variances, materials over which EPA does not as-
sert jurisdiction or which EPA has chosen not to regulate. Finally, the
regulations establish differing substantive controls for different types of
recycling. It is necessary to keep the ins and outs, yin and yang, of
EPA's regulation in mind when evaluating whether a material is a waste.
Nonetheless, enlightenment is possible.
A. Inclusion within the Definition of Solid Waste
EPA's general definition of solid waste is broad. It includes all
materials that are "abandoned" by being burned, buried, accumulated, or
stored.63 Its treatment of "recycled" materials is more complex. As the
Agency states in the preamble to its regulations: "The amended defini-
tion adopts the approach that for secondary materials being recycled, one
must know both what the material is and how it is being recycled before
determining whether or not it is a Subtitle C waste." 64 The regulations
define both classes of secondary materials and types of recycling activi-
ties. The two elements are combined in a table or "matrix" that shows
which classes of materials undergoing what type of recycling constitute
solid waste subject to RCRA regulation.
1. Classification of Secondary Materials
Although the preamble to the EPA regulations describes the class of
regulated recyclable wastes as "secondary materials," that term does not
itself appear in the regulations.65 Rather, the regulations specify six
classes of recyclable materials as potential wastes:
63. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(2)(i) (1988). EPA regulations limit the application of the defini-
tion of solid waste to materials that are also hazardous. Section 261.1(b)(1) provides:
The definition of solid waste contained in this part applies only to wastes that are also
hazardous for purposes of the regulations implementing Subtitle C of RCRA. For
example, it does not apply to materials (such as non-hazardous scrap, paper, textiles,
or rubber) that are not otherwise hazardous wastes and that are recycled.
This creates the nicely circular situation that a waste must be a solid waste to be a hazardous
waste and hazardous to be a solid waste. This is the first step of the journey into the wonders
of EPA's definition of solid waste.
64. Original Definition, supra note 8, at 618.
65. The preamble states:
Throughout this preamble, EPA refers for convenience to 'secondary materials.' We
mean a material that potentially can be a solid and hazardous waste when recycled.
The rule itself refers to the following types of secondary materials: spent materials,
sludges, by-products, scrap metal, and commercial chemical products recycled in
ways that differ from their normal use. The rule does not use the term secondary
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Spent Materials. Spent materials are substances that are no longer
usable without regeneration. 66 The example the Agency frequently uses
is spent solvents, which must have contaminants removed before they
can be reused. 67
Byproducts. Unlike spent materials, byproducts are materials that
are incidentally produced in industrial, commercial, mining, or agricul-
tural operations. 68 Byproducts are distinguished from coproducts, which
ordinarily are used as commercial products without further processing. 69
Coproducts are not wastes. 70 Byproducts are further subdivided into
listed byproducts, which are considered hazardous by virtue of a specific
regulatory decision to list the material, and unlisted byproducts, which
are classified as hazardous because they exhibit a hazardous
characteristic. 7'
Sludges. Sludges are residues from pollution control equipment, 72
such as biological wastewater treatment systems or air pollution control
scrubbers. Like byproducts, sludges are also divided into listed and un-
listed classes of hazardous wastes. 73
Commercial Chemical Products. Some commercial chemical prod-
ucts are treated as solid hazardous wastes. Commercial chemical prod-
ucts and off-specification variants and residues may be classified as
wastes if they are burned or applied to the land and this is not their
normal intended use. 74 For example, discarded or off-specification pesti-
cides burned for energy recovery may be classed as wastes. 75 However,
listed commercial chemical products that are applied to the land or
burned are not defined as RCRA wastes if that is their ordinary manner
of use.
7 6
Scrap Metal. Scrap metal is defined as bits and pieces of metal
"which when worn or superfluous can be recycled" 77 and generally in-
materials.
Id. at 616 n.4.
66. 40 C.F.R. § 261.1(c)(1) (1988).
67. See, e.g., Original Definition, supra note 8, at 624.
68. 40 C.F.R. § 261.1(c)(3) (1988).
69. See Original Definition, supra note 8, at 625.
70. See id. A coproduct is a product "produced for the general public's use [which is]
ordinarily used in the form .. .produced by the process." 40 C.F.R. § 261.1(c)(3) (1988).
71. Unlisted byproducts (and unlisted sludges) that are reclaimed are only wastes if desig-
nated or listed by EPA. See infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
distinction and its rationale.
72. 40 C.F.R. § 261.1(c)(2) (1988). Sludges may be solids, semisolids, or liquids but do
not include treated wastewater effluents. See id. § 260.10.
73. See supra note 15.
74. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.33 (1988); see also id. § 261.2(a)(2)(i).
75. See Original Definition, supra note 8, at 618.
76. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c)(1)(ii)-(2)(ii) (1988).
77. Id. § 261.1(c)(6).
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cludes metal wastes from both consumer and metal processing. 78 The
definition does not include other types of wastes that contain metals,
such as sludges or spent solvents; these wastes are classified as sludges
and spent materials for purposes of regulation. 79
Designated Wastes. EPA's regulations designate certain materials as
"inherently waste-like."' 80  Specific materials that are not otherwise de-
fined as solid wastes may be designated as solid wastes based on the crite-
ria specified in this regulation. These criteria include whether the
material is ordinarily disposed of, burned, or incinerated, whether it con-
tains toxic materials not normally found in raw materials for which the
recycled materials substitute, and whether the material poses a substan-
tial hazard to human health and the environment when recycled.8' To
date, EPA has designated only certain materials containing dioxin as in-
herently waste-like. 82
2. Classification of Recycling Activities
Although these six classes of recyclable materials are potentially
within EPA's regulatory definition of "solid waste" under Subtitle C,
they must also be recycled in one of four specific ways to be subject to
regulation under RCRA.83
Use Constituting Disposal. Use constituting disposal is the applica-
tion or placement of secondary materials on the land "in a manner that
constitutes disposal."'8 4 This encompasses not only the direct land appli-
cation of wastes (as is done in some instances as a dust suppressant), but
78. Original Definition, supra note 8, at 624.
79. See id. EPA has deferred substantive regulation of the recycling of scrap metal.
Thus, this distinction has important regulatory consequences.
80. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(d) (1988).
81. Id. § 261.2(d)(2). The preamble states that materials may be designated as wastes
under this provision if:
(a) They are typically disposed of or incinerated on an industry-wide basis, or (b)
they contain toxic constituents in concentrations not ordinarily found in the raw
materials or products for which they substitute, which toxic constituents are not
used, reused, or reclaimed during the recycling process. In addition, recycling of the
materials must have the potential to pose a substantial hazard to human health and
the environment. The Agency believes these criteria are relatively straightforward
and understandable.
Original Definition, supra note 8, at 637.
Although the Agency said little about the rationale for these criteria when they were first
promulgated, see id., the Agency has subsequently claimed that these factors "address the
element of discard necessarily involved in recycling these materials." Identification and List-
ing of Hazardous Waste; Amendments to Definition of Solid Waste, 53 Fed. Reg. 519, 523
(1988) [hereinafter Amendments to Definition]; see infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
82. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(d)(1) (1988).
83. Id. § 261.2(c).
84. Id. § 261.2(c)(1)(i)(A). EPA has asserted jurisdiction over "waste-derived products
whose recycling is similar to a normal form of waste management-in this case, land dispo-
sal." Original Definition, supra note 8, at 628.
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also the land application of products that contain wastes.8 5 Under EPA's
definition, "waste derived products" such as fertilizers, asphalt, and
building foundation materials (including concrete) are subject to RCRA
jurisdiction if they contain hazardous wastes as an ingredient.8 6
Burning for Energy Recovery. Burning for energy recovery is the
burning of secondary materials as a fuel, the use of secondary materials
to produce a fuel, or the burning of fuels that contain secondary materi-
als.8 7 Burning waste oil in a boiler for heat is the classic example of
burning for energy recovery.
EPA's substantive regulatory requirements distinguish burning
wastes for energy recovery from incinerating wastes as a means of dispo-
sal. Hazardous waste incinerators are subject to a comprehensive set of
requirements under RCRA as hazardous waste treatment facilities.88 In
contrast, the burning of wastes for energy recovery by industrial furnaces
and boilers is now largely exempt from control while EPA develops sub-
stantive regulations. 89 Current EPA regulations do provide guidance for
distinguishing between incineration and burning in industrial furnaces
and boilers,90 as well as a variance mechanism to designate an industrial
combustion device as a boiler, rather than as an incinerator. 91
Speculative Accumulation. Speculative accumulation involves long
term storage of secondary materials for later recycling. Storing materials
is not "speculative accumulation" if the material is potentially recyclable,
the holder has a feasible means for recycling, and the amount recycled
85. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c)(1)(i)(B) (1988).
86. Original Definition, supra note 8, at 628. Under EPA regulations, if a hazardous
waste that is hazardous solely because it exhibits a hazardous characteristic (i.e., corrosivity,
ignitability, reactivity, or toxicity, see supra note 15) is mixed with other material, the mixture
itself is hazardous only if the mixture as a whole exhibits the characteristic. 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.3(b)(3), (c), (d) (1988). Thus, if a product is derived from a hazardous waste, the prod-
uct might not be hazardous if it does not exhibit the characteristics. See Original Definition,
supra note 8, at 628.
EPA has adopted an additional provision exempting some products produced for the pub-
lic's use that contain wastes. These products, which otherwise would be classified as wastes or
waste-derived products used in a manner constituting disposal, are exempt from regulation if
"the recyclable materials have undergone a chemical reaction ... so as to become inseparable
[from the other substances] by physical means." 40 C.F.R. § 266.20(b) (1988). The extent to
which this provision exempts hazardous wastes used in the manufacture of asphalt and con-
crete is unclear. EPA has stated, however, that cement and aggregate produced in furnaces
burning hazardous waste as fuel are not classified as hazardous wastes unless they use hazard-
ous waste as ingredients. See Land Disposal Restrictions for First Third Scheduled Wastes, 53
Fed. Reg. 31,138, 31,198 (1988) (final rule).
87. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(e)(2) (1988). EPA asserts jurisdiction over all hazardous secon-
dary materials used as fuels or to make fuels. See Original Definition, supra note 8, at 629.
88. 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.340-.351 (1988).
89. See id. §§ 266.30-.35. EPA proposed a set of substantive requirements for industrial
furnaces and boilers in May 1987. Burning of Hazardous Waste in Boilers and Industrial
Furnaces, 52 Fed. Reg. 16,982 (1987) (proposed rule).
90. 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 (1988); see also Original Definition, supra note 8, at 630.
91. 40 C.F.R. §§ 260.32-.33 (1988).
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during a one-year calendar period is at least 75% of the amount accumu-
lated at the beginning of the year.92 The regulations place the burden on
the accumulator to demonstrate that the storage is not "speculative
accumulation. '9 3
Reclamation. Reclamation is the regeneration of wastes or the re-
covery of usable material from wastes, and it probably accords with the
most common conception of recycling. Recovering the lead content
from spent batteries, for example, is a form of reclamation, as is regener-
ating spent acids or solvents for reuse. 94
EPA distinguishes between reclamation, which involves the
reprocessing or recovery of materials, and the direct use of a secondary
material as an ingredient in a product. EPA does not treat secondary
materials directly used as ingredients as wastes; the Agency has stated
that "secondary materials put to direct use in this way are being used
essentially as products. '95 EPA claims that secondary materials directly
used as products are not wastes and, therefore, are not subject to regula-
tion under RCRA.96
3. The Matrix of Materials and Uses
EPA promulgated the following Table that formally classifies which




disposal recovery/fuel Reclamation accumulation
(§ 261.2(c)(1)) (§ 261.2(c)(2)) (§ 261.2(c)(3)) (§ 261.2(c)(4))
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spent Materials .................. (*) (*) (*) (*)
Sludges (listed in 40 CFR Part
261.31 or 261.32) ............. (*) () (*) ()
Sludges exhibiting a characteristic of
hazardous waste .............. .(*) ............ (*)
By-products (listed in 40 CFR Part
261.31 or 261.32) ............. (*) (*) (*) (*)
By-products exhibiting a
characteristic of hazardous waste (*)............ (*)
Commercial chemical products
listed in 40 CFR 261.33 ........ (*) (*) ............. ..
Scrap metal ..................... . (*) (*) (*) (*)
Note: The terms "spent materials," "sludges," "by-products," and "scrap metal" are defined
in § 261.1.
Source: 40 C.F.R. Sec. 261.2 (1988)
92. Id. § 261.1(c)(8).
93. Id.
94. Id. § 261.1(c)( 4 ).
95. Original Definition, supra note 8, at 633; see also 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(e) (1988).
96. See infra note 110.
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The logic of the matrix may not be immediately apparent. 97 Never-
theless, one basis for classifying materials as wastes does seem clear. Vir-
tually all recyclable materials are defined as solid wastes if they are
applied to land, burned, or accumulated speculatively. The common
thread is that these "recycling" methods are in most senses equivalent to
disposal or storage of hazardous wastes. To define such uses as legiti-
mate, unregulated recycling would create a potentially enormous and
dangerous loophole in the RCRA system.
The rationale for EPA's treatment of reclamation is less intuitively
obvious. All scrap metal, spent material (whether listed or unlisted), and
listed byproducts and sludges are RCRA wastes when reclaimed. 98 Un-
listed byproducts and sludges that are reclaimed are not considered
wastes, however, unless they are specifically designated as such by the
Agency. 99 In the preamble to the 1985 regulation, EPA discussed the
criteria that it would use to decide whether unlisted byproducts and
sludges should be specifically designated as RCRA wastes. 1oo These cri-
teria include how frequently the material is recycled on an industry-wide
basis, whether the material is replacing a raw material, and the degree to
which the reclaimed material is similar in composition to the raw mate-
rial. The Agency has stated that these criteria are intended to "show that
the material is handled as a commodity."'' °
Certainly there is no environmental justification for regulating all
spent materials while leaving the regulation of unlisted byproducts and
sludges to a case-by-case determination. EPA seems to assume that
spent materials, even when reclaimed, are almost always considered to be
discarded wastes by the generator and that regulation is therefore war-
ranted. Unlisted byproducts and sludges are not intrinsically less dan-
gerous than spent materials, however. Apparently EPA was reluctant to
classify all byproducts and sludges as solid wastes per se because byprod-
ucts and sludges may or may not be considered wastes by the
generator. 0 2
97. See infra notes 212-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of EPA's rationale for
classifying materials as solid wastes.
98. Original Definition, supra note 8, at 641.
99. 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.31-.32 (1988).
100. Original Definition, supra note 8, at 641. In response to American Mining Congress,
EPA has proposed to promulgate these criteria as regulations. See infra notes 206-09 and
accompanying text.
101. Original Definition, supra note 8, at 641.
102. The Agency did not fully explain this distinction in the preamble accompanying the
final 1985 regulation. However, in the preamble to the 1983 proposal, the Agency explained
that:
These provisions do not apply to all spent materials, but only to listed sludges and
listed by-products-to avoid including sludges and by-products routinely processed
to recover usable products as part of normal commercial practice. Although some of
those materials may be wastes, the Agency wishes to consider them individually
before asserting jurisdiction, since many of them also have product-like aspects.
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EPA does recognize that some recycling involving the direct use of
secondary materials may be a "'sham," intended merely to avoid the cost
of waste disposal. In the preamble to the final regulation-but nowhere
in the regulation itself-the Agency stated the factors that it considers
relevant in determining whether a recycling activity is a "sham."',0 3
These factors focus on "recycling" operations where the recycled mate-
rial is ineffective or only marginally effective for its intended use, where
the materials are used in an amount greater than necessary, where the
operator fails to keep adequate records, or where the operator stores or
handles the materials inadequately.1°4 EPA regulations provide that
anyone claiming an exemption based on reclamation activities has the
burden of proof in establishing that they legitimately are within the terms
of the regulation. 0 5
Finally, it is also important to note that the products made from
recycled hazardous wastes are not themselves wastes unless they are
burned for fuel or directly applied to land. 0 6 In fact, reclaimed secon-
dary materials are regulated as solid wastes only between the time they
are generated and the time they are inserted into the reclamation
process. 07
B. Exclusions, Exemptions, and Variances
EPA's broadly inclusive definition of solid waste is substantially nar-
rowed by a series of exclusions, exemptions, and a variance from its regu-
latory treatment of recyclable materials. 0 8 The exclusions, exemptions,
and the variance also are central to EPA's rationale for defining materi-
als as wastes. By using these exceptions, the Agency is able to use a
broad definition of solid waste, while exempting from regulation materi-
Proposed Standards, supra note 36, at 14,486.
In its 1988 proposal in response to American Mining Congress, the Agency stated:
[S]ludges and by-products are more likely than spent materials to be involved in
ongoing manufacturing operations. The existing rules thus classify sludges and by-
products on a case-by-case basis based on factors which distinguish on-going manu-
facturing from waste management. Spent materials requiring reclamation, on the
other hand, are not directly usable in ongoing manufacturing processes because, by
definition, they are no longer usable and must first be restored to a usable condition.
Amendments to Definition, supra note 81, at 522.
103. Original Definition, supra note 8, at 638.
104. Id. EPA has subsequently discussed the issue of whether burning of hazardous
wastes as fuel constitutes "sham" recycling. See Burning of Hazardous Waste in Boilers and
Industrial Furnaces, 52 Fed. Reg. 16,982, 17,013 (1987) (proposed rule); Hazardous Waste
Management System; Burning of Waste Fuel and Used Oil in Boilers and Industrial Furnaces,
50 Fed. Reg. 49,166 (1985) (final rule).
105. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(f) (1988); see also Original Definition, supra note 8, at 642-43.
106. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(c)(2)(i) (1988). In keeping with EPA's commitment to clarity,
the regulations make this important point as a parenthetical comment to provisions in the
definition of hazardous waste.
107. See infra note 237.
108. Original Definition, supra note 8, at 614; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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als not normally thought of as wastes. The two main categories of mate-
rials treated in this way are those that are part of an ongoing production
process and those that are being directly used as products. 10 9 The
Agency disclaims authority to classify such materials as solid waste."10
1. Exclusions from the Definition of Solid Waste
As discussed above, EPA broadly defines solid waste to include
many materials reused or recycled in specific ways."I EPA's exclusions
to this otherwise broad definition of solid wastes provide that:
Materials are not solid wastes if they can be shown to be recycled by
being:
(i) Used or reused as ingredients in an industrial process to make a
product, provided these materials are not being reclaimed; or
(ii) Used or reused as effective substitutes for commercial products;
or
(iii) Returned to the original process from which they are gener-
ated, without first being reclaimed. The material must be returned as a
substitute for raw material feedstock, and the process must use raw
materials as principal feedstocks." 12
These exclusions accomplish at least two objectives. First, they en-
sure that recyclable materials that are directly reused as a product, or as
an ingredient in a product, are not regulated by RCRA. Second, they
exclude materials that are still part of an ongoing manufacturing process.
This exclusion, applicable to what the Agency calls "closed-loop re-
cycling," is quite narrow. To qualify, the secondary material must be
returned directly (as feedstock) to the original primary production pro-
cess in which it was generated; the material cannot be reclaimed sepa-
rately and then returned to the process. 13
109. Original Definition, supra note 8, at 619.
110. The Agency has stated: "We believe, however, that the grant of authority in RCRA
over recycling activities is not unlimited. Specifically, we do not believe our authority extends
to certain types of recycling activities that are shown to be very similar to normal production
operations or to normal uses of commercial products." Id. at 616-17.
111. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(b)-(d) (1988); see supra notes 63-97 and accompanying text.
112. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(e)(1) (1988). The exclusion does not apply, however, to secondary
materials that are used in disposal, burned for energy recovery, speculatively accumulated, or
that have been designated as inherently waste-like. Id. § 261.2(e)(2). Further, this exclusion
does not apply to recycled materials, such as spent materials, that are reclaimed before use. Id.
§ 261.2(e)(1).
EPA had proposed a broader exclusion that covered situations where a facility reclaimed
and reused materials onsite. However, the Agency concluded that that was too broad and
would have excluded activities from the definition of solid waste that should properly be cov-
ered. EPA stated that it rejected the proposed exclusion "because the risk of damage from
spills and leaks at these [reclamation] facilities indicates that regulation is necessary to protect
human health and the environment." Original Definition, supra note 8, at 617.
The Agency's judgment on this matter is questionable. See infra notes 239-60 and accom-
panying text.
113. The preamble states:
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2. Variance from the Definition of Solid Waste
Although materials that are reclaimed are not eligible for the
"closed-loop recycling" exclusion, the regulations do authorize a case-by-
case variance for some reclaimed materials. EPA may grant a variance
for secondary materials "that are reclaimed and then reused within the
original primary production process in which they were generated," 1 4 if
the reclamation is an "essential part" of the primary production pro-
cess."I5  Apparently, this variance applies to unusual situations where
reclamation of secondary materials is part of an ongoing industrial pro-
cess. 116 It is, in fact, a "closed-loop variance," distinct from the "closed-
loop exclusion" described above. 117
EPA assesses a number of factors to determine whether to grant a
variance. 1' 8 These include the economic viability of the production pro-
cess if it were to use virgin rather than reclaimed materials, the location
of the reclamation operation in relation to the production process, the
prevalence of the reclamation process within the industry, the length of
time between generation and reclamation, whether the person who gener-
ates the material also reclaims it, and other "relevant factors." ' 19 EPA
In our opinion, there are three key requirements to a closed-loop process-that is, a
production process that at some point utilizes secondary materials but nevertheless is
both essentially ongoing and closely interrelated throughout all steps. The first re-
quirement is the return of secondary materials to the original process without under-
going significant alteration or reprocessing, namely without first being reclaimed.
Second, the production process to which these unreclaimed materials are returned
itself must be primary material based-i.e., the materials must be returned to a pri-
mary production process. . . . Third, the secondary material must be returned as
feedstock to the original production process and must be recycled as part of that
process.
Original Definition, supra note 8, at 639 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
114. 40 C.F.R. § 260.30(b) (1988). In addition, the regulation authorizes a variance for
secondary materials that are speculatively accumulated without sufficient amounts being re-
cycled or that are reclaimed but need further reclamation. Id. § 260.30(a)-(c).
115. Id. § 260.31(b).
116. See Original Definition, supra note 8, at 654.
117. In 1986, EPA promulgated an exclusion for certain closed-loop tank recycling opera-
tions. This provision excluded from classification as solid waste certain types of recycling that
were eligible for the "closed-loop variance." The Agency wrote:
EPA is taking this step because these types of operations are best viewed as part of
the production process, not as a distinct waste management operation. The Agency,
in essence, is determining generically that tank systems that meet the requirements
specified below satisfy the criteria specified in 260.31 (b)(1) through (8) for granting a
closed-loop variance.
Hazardous Waste Management System; Standards for Hazardous Waste Storage and Treat-
ment Tank Systems, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,422, 25,442 (1986) (final rule) [hereinafter Final
Standards].
118. Id.
119. Id. The preamble to the regulation states that the Agency may only grant the vari-
ance if the reclamation and reuse is conducted by the same person. Original Definition, supra
note 8, at 655. This appears to contradict the regulation, which lists the identity of the re-
claimer as a factor to consider and is apparently an error. See 40 C.F.R. § 260.3 1(b)(7) (1988).
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also requires that the reclaimed material be used directly within the origi-
nal production process.' 20
3. Exemptions from the Definition of Solid Waste
In addition to the definitional exclusions and variance provisions,
EPA regulations also exempt certain wastes from RCRA controls.' 2'
Some wastes, such as domestic sewage and wastes covered under other
regulatory programs, are exempted by statute. 22 The regulations also
expressly exempt two specific industrial wastes-pulping liquors re-
claimed in the paper industry, and spent sulfuric acid used to produce
virgin sulfuric acid. 123 EPA claims that it exempted spent sulfuric acid,
in part, simply as a clarification that the manufacturing process did not
involve reclamation and the material was not a solid waste. 124 Thus, this
exemption provides one specific industry a clarification of its status.
EPA justified the exemption of reclaimed pulping liquors by saying that
the industry essentially qualified for a generic closed-loop variance.
25
Finally, in 1986 EPA promulgated another exemption for certain
types of closed-loop recycling involving tank systems. 126 This decision
120. 40 C.F.R. § 260.31(b) (1988). The preamble to the regulation states:
The material that is returned also must be 'reused' when returned to the original
process. We mean by this that the material must contribute directly to the produc-
tion process as an ingredient, reactant, or an alternative feedstock. Secondary mater-
ials returned to a smelting furnace are an example. Solvents reclaimed and utilized
for degreasing are not, because the reclaimed solvents are not contributing to the
production process.
Original Definition, supra note 8, at 654-55.
The Agency might not, however, intend to apply this requirement too strictly. See infra
note 125.
121. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a) (1988).
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1982); see also 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a) (1988). Discharges
permitted under the Clean Water Act and special nuclear material regulated by the Atomic
Energy Act, for example, are excluded from the definition of solid waste. Id.
Additionally, EPA regulations exclude certain solid wastes from classification as "hazard-
ous wastes." These include, among others, household wastes. Id. § 261.4(b).
123. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(6)-(7) (1988).
124. See Original Definition, supra note 8, at 642.
125. The variance regulation requires that the reclaimed materials be reused "within the
original primary production process in which they were generated." 40 C.F.R. § 260.30(b)
(1988). Although the regulations state that it must be returned to the "original" primary
production process, EPA justified excluding black liquor in the paper industry because the
Agency determined that "black liquor, on a generic basis, meets the standards for a closed loop
variance." Original Definition, supra note 8, at 641. In describing the paper industry opera-
tions, EPA stated that "[riecovery and reuse of black liquor can occur at a single paper mill,
and also can involve a second paper mill which reclaims black liquor for its own use or for
reuse by the generating mill." Id. This implies that EPA might not require that the reclaimed
material be returned to the identical primary production process but merely the same type of
production process within that industry. See also Final Standards, supra note 117, at 25,442
(discussing the meaning of the requirement that materials be returned to the original produc-
tion process).
126. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(8) (1988).
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was based on the Agency's "generic" determination that such systems
satisfy the requiiements for a closed-loop variance. 127
EPA seems ambivalent about promulgating industry-specific regula-
tions for recycling activities. The Agency has stated that "variances for
broad classes of recycled wastes are unwarranted, because the variances
would too easily become surrogate permits."'' 28 It did, however, issue
the two industry-specific exemptions described above. Further, EPA has
deferred substantive regulation of other specific industries and has
adopted less stringent substantive requirements for specific types of re-
cycling operations. 129
C. Requirements for Recycled Materials
The set of substantive controls that EPA imposes on materials and
processes constitutes the final element in the Agency's regulatory pro-
gram for recyclable wastes. 130 Generally, EPA imposes stringent sub-
stantive requirements on facilities that treat, store, or dispose of
hazardous wastes (TSDF's). These include permitting requirements, no-
tification requirements, proof of financial responsibility, and specific stan-
dards for storage, containment, monitoring, and manifesting of the
wastes. 131
Recycling facilities, however, are not required to comply with all of
the substantive requirements applicable to waste disposal facilities in gen-
eral. In many cases, the recycling regulations, although purporting to
assert jurisdiction, defer any substantive control. 32 As with most of
EPA's treatment of recycling, the substantive requirements are confus-
ing, and their rationale is, at best, uncertain.
Some of the confusion stems from EPA's organization of its sub-
stantive requirements. Section 261.6 contains the general requirements
for recyclable materials. 33 In addition to the basic substantive require-
ments, this section also exempts some wastes from any regulatory re-
quirements 34 and cross-references the requirements for certain other
recyclable materials specified in Part 266.135 Part 266 contains the sub-
stantive requirements applicable to specific types of recycling including
127. See supra note 117.
128. Original Definition, supra note 8, at 654.
129. See, e.g., supra note 117 and accompanying text.
130. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.6 (1988).
131. See supra note 16 for a discussion of the general requirements applicable to genera-
tors, transporters, and operators of TSDF's under RCRA.
132. 40 C.F.R. § 261.6(a)(3) (1988) exempts from regulation industrial ethyl alcohol that
is reclaimed, used batteries returned for regeneration, used oil that exhibits a hazardous waste
characteristic, scrap metal, and other materials.
133. Id. § 261.6.
134. Id. § 261.6(a)(3); see supra note 132.
135. 40 C.F.R. § 261.6(a)(2) (1988).
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"Recyclable Materials Used in a Manner Constituting Disposal" 36 and
"Hazardous Waste Burned for Energy Recovery."' 37 And you thought
the worst was over.
On the surface, the regulations appear to subject facilities that re-
claim hazardous wastes to permitting, financial responsibility, and other
significant requirements. 38 However, in one of the most important and
best hidden provisions of the regulations, facilities that immediately re-
claim materials without storing them before recycling are subject only to
notification and manifesting requirements. 139 These facilities are under
no obligation to obtain a permit or meet other requirements, including
proof of financial responsibility. 140 Evidently, EPA's primary environ-
mental concern under RCRA is not the reclamation process itself, but
that spills or leaks might occur when hazardous materials are stored at a
recycling facility. 141
Because a facility that does not store its reclaimed materials faces far
less stringent regulation under RCRA than one that does, the question of
136. Id. §§ 266.20-.23.
137. Id. §§ 266.30-.35. Part 266 establishes regulatory requirements for specific hazardous
wastes and specific types of hazardous waste management facilities, including:
Subpart C-Recyclable Materials Used in a Manner Constituting Disposal (Land Applica-
tion). Under the Agency's regulations, hazardous secondary materials that are recycled by
applying them to the land are classified as "materials used in a manner that constitutes dispo-
sal." Id. § 266.20(a)(2). Subpart C of Part 266 also provides that generators and transporters
of materials used in a "manner that constitutes disposal," as well as owners and operators of
facilities that store or use recyclable materials that are to be disposed of in this manner are
generally subject to a full set of substantive regulatory requirements. Id. §§ 266.21-.23.
Subpart D-Hazardous Waste Burned for Energy Recovery. Most hazardous secondary
materials that are burned for energy recovery are classified as hazardous wastes. See id.
§§ 261.2(c)(2), 261.3. EPA has developed a complicated set of regulations that distinguish
"incinerators," whose purpose is destruction of hazardous waste, from "boilers and industrial
furnaces," in which wastes are burned to recover energy. See id. § 260.10. Incinerators are
subject to the applicable incinerator regulations as TSDF's. Id. §§ 264.340-.351. Boilers and
industrial furnaces that "recycle" wastes for their energy value are governed by the provisions
of Part 266, Subpart D. Id. §§ 266.30-.35. This regulation involves a complex set of require-
ments applicable to generators, transporters, and marketers of hazardous waste fuels as well as
owner/operators of facilities that use hazardous wastes as fuels. Id. The Hazardous and Solid
Waste Amendments of 1984 specifically address issues of production and use of hazardous
waste fuels. Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 204, 98 Stat. 3221, 3235-38 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6923,
6924, 6930 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)); H.R. REP. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. i, reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5576, 5598-5603.
Additionally, Part 266 contains standards for "Used Oil Burned for Energy Recovery,"
40 C.F.R. §§ 266.40-.44 (1988), "Recyclable Materials Utilized for Precious Metal Recovery,"
id. § 266.70, and "Spent Lead-Acid Batteries Being Reclaimed," id. § 266.80.
138. 40 C.F.R. § 261.6(c)(1) (1988).
139. Id. § 261.6(c)(2). Hazardous wastes recycled by burning for energy recovery or by
land application in a "manner constituting disposal" are not subject to this provision. Id.
§ 261.6(a)(2). This provision essentially applies only to reclamation activities.
140. The regulations state that "facilities that recycle recyclable materials without storing
them before they are recycled" are not required to have a permit and are subject only to
notification requirements and the obligation to deal with manifested wastes. Id. § 261.6(c)(2).
141. See infra notes 239-47 and accompanying text.
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what constitutes storage is critical. The regulations define "storage" as
"the holding of hazardous waste for a temporary period, at the end of
which the hazardous waste is treated, disposed of, or stored else-
where."' 142 There is, however, no definition of "temporary," and thus
storage for any period of time in drums or tanks prior to processing is
likely to invoke the substantive requirements. Nor is it clear whether
physically connecting "holding" tanks to a recycling process would avoid
classification as RCRA storage. It is odd that what is, potentially the
most important general exemption for recyclable materials should rest on
so fine a distinction.
EPA's regulation of recyclable materials attempts to balance the
competing objectives of environmental protection, enhanced recycling,
and regulatory effectiveness. Nonetheless, no one working with the regu-
lations can feel satisfied with the final product. The regulations are hor-
rendously complex, make fine distinctions that have significant
regulatory consequences, and simply do not seem to have a coherent
basis.
After a discussion of how the treatment of the regulations in Ameri-
can Mining Congress further confused matters, this Article suggests pos-
sible revisions to the regulations that would rationalize the Agency's
approach.
II
AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS V. EPA
In 1985, trade associations representing mining and petroleum inter-
ests challenged EPA's definition of solid waste, claiming that EPA had
exceeded "its regulatory authority in seeking to bring materials that are
not discarded or otherwise disposed of within the compass of 'waste.' "143
The petroleum industry opposed the definition because EPA classified as
solid waste certain hydrocarbon fractions that escape from refinery pro-
duction vessels and are reinserted into the petroleum refining process. 44
The mining industry was concerned that the definition covered materials,
including dusts released during the processing of a metal, that are rein-
serted into the mining extraction process for additional extraction. 145
142. 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 (1988). Under RCRA, generators are allowed to store hazardous
wastes onsite for up to ninety days without obtaining a permit. Id. § 262.34(a). It is unlikely
that EPA intended the storage provisions applicable to recyclers to reflect this time period.
Certainly neither the regulations themselves nor the preamble makes any reference to the
ninety-day storage provisions. However, it is an interesting question whether a generator, who
is entitled to store material for ninety days without a TSDF permit, is required to obtain the
permit if the generator reclaims the materials during that period.
143. American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
144. Id. at 1181.
145. Id. at 1180-81. See infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text for a full discussion of
the basis on which these materials were classified as wastes under the EPA regulations.
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The court, with Judge Starr writing for a two-to-one majority, inval-
idated EPA's regulatory definition of solid waste. 146 Analyzing the term
"other discarded material" found in RCRA's definition of "solid
waste,"' 147 the court concluded that Congress intended RCRA to apply
only to materials that had "truly" been discarded in the sense of having
been "disposed of, thrown away or abandoned."'14s After analyzing
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC149 and other cases defining the limits of
judicial review of agency interpretation of statutes, 150 the court refused to
defer to EPA's interpretation of RCRA, finding the statutory language
and the intent of Congress clear and unambiguous.' 51
146. A ripeness issue was raised because the regulations specifically exempted both petro-
leum refining wastes that are recycled by being reinserted into the refining process and wastes
generated from the smelting and refining of ores and minerals. The court concluded it was
appropriate to consider petitioners' claims with respect to activities that were exempt because,
under the test in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), the issue was in a
posture fit for resolution and withholding review would constitute a hardship to the parties.
American Mining Congress, 824 F.2d at 1180 n.3. The court noted that Congress intended
prompt resolution of issues regarding EPA's RCRA regulations in order to avoid delays in
implementation of the important environmental program. Id.
147. RCRA defines solid waste as:
any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment
plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material, including solid,
liquid, semisolid or contained gaseous material, resulting from industrial, commer-
cial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from community activities.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1982) (emphasis added).
148. American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1190.
149. 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (upholding the EPA's definition of "stationary source" under the
Clean Air Act as Congress' intent was unclear and the Agency's construction was reasonable).
150. 824 F.2d at 1192-93.
151. Id. at 1193. The majority discussed at length the case law defining its role in review-
ing agency regulations. The court noted that the principles enunciated in Chevron and its
progeny guided the court's inquiry. Id. at 1182. Under Chevron, review of an agency regula-
tion is a two-step process. First, the court is to determine if Congress has " 'directly spoken to
the precise question at issue.' " Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842). If it has, the unambig-
uous intent of Congress must govern. If the statute is silent or ambiguous on the issue, then
the court must limit its inquiry to determining whether the agency's answer is based on " 'a
permissible construction' " of the statute. Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
After reviewing a series of cases construing the court's role in light of Chevron, including
I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (rejecting the Attorney General's interpreta-
tion that the standards of proof under the Refugee Act and the Immigration and Nationality
Act are identical), Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986) (rejecting
the Federal Reserve Board's extension of its jurisdiction to "non-bank" banks), and United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1986) (affirming the Corps of Engineers'
definition of "waters of the United States"), the court concluded that EPA's regulatory defini-
tion could not be justified in light of Congress' clear and unambiguous intention. 824 F.2d at
1193. Distinguishing earlier cases, the court held that the Agency's definition could not be
justified as an attempt to reach the evils Congress intended to be regulated that would other-
wise escape regulation. The court wrote:
We are thus not presented with a situation in which Congress likely intended that the
pivotal jurisdictional term be read in its broadest sense, detached from everyday par-
lance; instead, we have a situation in which Congress, perhaps through the process of
legislative compromise which courts must be loathe to tear asunder, employed a term




In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on a number of factors.
First, it found the "ordinary, plain-English" meaning of a statutory term
was entitled to considerable weight.152 Based on the Webster's Diction-
ary definition, the court stated that including materials that are immedi-
ately reused within the scope of discarded materials "strains, to say the
least, the everyday usage of that term."' 153
Although the court found that the word "discarded" had a clear
meaning, it also examined RCRA's overall scope to determine if Con-
gress expressed an intention to define "discarded" in other than its ordi-
nary sense. 154 The court concluded that Congress adopted RCRA to
protect health and the environment by regulating hazardous wastes and
by encouraging the development of alternatives to existing methods of
disposal, including recycling. 55 Judge Starr added that:
To fulfill these purposes, it seems clear that EPA need not regulate
"spent" materials that are recycled and reused in an ongoing manufactur-
ing or industrial process. These materials have not yet .become part of
the waste disposal problem; rather, they are destined for beneficial reuse
or recycling in a continuous process by the generating industry itself 156
The court also relied on the fact that RCRA contains thirty-nine
specific definitions; the court called this "definitional specificity of the
first order."'157 Somehow, this indicated to the court that the term "dis-
carded" was to be defined narrowly. The court also applied the "long-
standing canon of statutory construction, ejusdem generis. "158 The court
Id. at 1187.
In fact, the court's entire opinion is premised on its conclusion that the meaning of solid
waste is clear and unambiguous. Id. at 1193. If a review of EPA's regulations and the prob-
lem of recycled materials demonstrates anything, it is that nothing is clear and unambiguous in
this field. In fact, the issue is only clear and unambiguous if the court ignores EPA's rationale
for its regulatory decisions embodied in its definition of solid waste. See infra notes 182-89 and
accompanying text.
In light of Chevron, the court's analysis is shocking on its face. As the dissent points out,
the majority acknowledged that EPA's analysis of RCRA was of "marginal force" and that
the legislative history supporting the Agency's position was "ambiguous at best." 824 F.2d at
1194-95. Notwithstanding some indication of contrary legislative intent, however, the dissent
concluded that "Chevron therefore requires us to give effect to the agency interpretation if it is
reasonable." Id. at 1195.
This debate illustrates that "Chevron and its progeny" have not been successful in limiting
courts' authority to review substantively the reasonableness of an agency's legislative construc-
tion. Chevron merely requires the court to restate its conclusions in terms of formalistic hold-
ings about the clarity or ambiguity of Congressional intent.
152. 824 F.2d at 1184. To the court, the term "discarded" is "neither inherently difficult
to define nor is so intimately tied to knowledge of the industry and the practicalities of regula-
tion that definition requires agency expertise." Id. at 1184 n.7.
153. Id. at 1184.
154. Id. at 1185-90.
155. Id. at 1185.
156. Id. at 1186 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
157. Id. at 1189.
158. Id.
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concluded that because the phrase "other discarded materials" followed
the terms "garbage, refuse and sludge from a waste treatment plant,
water supply treatment plant or air pollution control facility" 59 in the
definition of solid waste, it should be construed to include materials that,
like the other terms, fit the ordinary definition of discarded. 160
In response to EPA's assertion that there are numerous statutory
provisions that indicate Congress intended RCRA to regulate the re-
cycling of hazardous waste, the court noted that this involved a circular
argument: because the referenced sections only apply to "hazardous
wastes," it was circular to rely on them to determine what in fact consti-
tutes wastes. 161
EPA also presented the court with two provisions of RCRA, added
in 1984 by HSWA, 162 to support its claim that RCRA was intended to
apply to recycled secondary materials. 163 These subsections, 6924(q) and
(r), deal specifically with the regulation of hazardous wastes used as
fuel.t 64 Both contain language suggesting that petroleum wastes rein-
serted into a refining process should be regulated as wastes in the absence
of a statutory exemption. 65 Subsection 6924(q) requires EPA to pro-
mulgate standards for owners and operators of facilities that produce a
fuel from hazardous waste; the same subsection, however, exempts "pe-
troleum refinery wastes containing oil which are converted into petro-
leum coke at the same facility at which such wastes were generated."' 66
Similarly, subsection 6924(r) requires the labeling of fuel produced from
hazardous waste, but exempts fuels produced from petroleum refining
waste containing oil if "such materials are generated and reinserted on-
site into the refining process."' 167
159. Id. at 1190.
160. Id.
161. The court concluded that "EPA's various arguments based on the statute itself are,
upon analysis, circular, relying upon the term 'solid waste' or 'hazardous waste' to extend the
reach of those very terms. This, all would surely agree, will not do." Id. at 1187.
In fact, the court was somewhat glib in dismissing EPA's arguments as circular. Several
of the provisions on which EPA relied do not define their scope in terms of "wastes." Subsec-
tion 3004(r)(3) of RCRA, for example, applies to "oily materials." 42 U.S.C. § 6924(r)(3)
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Subsection 3004(q)(1) defines "hazardous waste" to include certain
types of commercial chemical products. Id. § 6924(q)(1). And circular or not, it is quite clear
that Congress intended that used oil, if sufficiently hazardous, be treated as a hazardous waste
if recycled. Id. § 6935.
162. Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
163. 824 F.2d at 1187-89.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(q)-(r) (Supp. IV 1986).
165. Id.; see also 824 F.2d at 1187-89.
166. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(q)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). Compare id § 6924(q)(1) with id.
§ 6924(q)(2)(A).
167. Id. § 6924(r)(2)(A).
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Although the court acknowledged that these sections provided
"some support" for EPA's position, and were of "marginal force,' 1 68 it
concluded that they did not contradict the court's conclusion that solid
waste only includes materials that had been truly discarded. 69 Again
the court found EPA's logic circular and noted that subsection 6924(q)
exempts only materials already classified as wastes.' 70 As for subsection
6924(r), the court argued rather unconvincingly that it applies only to
material that "has indeed become hazardous waste, has reached a haz-
ardous waste treatment facility, and is being recycled at that point."' 17'
Finally, the court reviewed the legislative history of RCRA and the
1984 amendments, but found nothing to contradict its earlier conclusion
that the language was plain and unambiguous. 72 One passage from the
Report of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce potentially
supported EPA's argument:
This proposed section of the bill amends [proposed section 6921] of
RCRA to require the Administrator to issue regulations regarding use,
reuse, recycling, and reclamation of hazardous wastes. This provision is
intended to reaffirm the Agency's existing authority to regulate as [sic]
hazardous waste to the extent it may be necessary to protect human
health and the environment. The Committee affirms that RCRA already
provides regulatory authority over these activities (which authority the
Agency has exercised to a limited degree) and in this provision is amend-
ing to clarify that materials being used, reused, recycled, or reclaimed
can indeed be solid and hazardous wastes and that these various re-
cycling activities may constitute hazardous waste treatment, storage, or
disposal. 173
The court found this statement "ambiguous at best."' 74 The circularity
argument, together with other portions of legislative history indicating
that EPA's authority is limited to regulating the disposal of discarded
materials, led the court to reject EPA's arguments. 75
Ultimately, the court invalidated EPA's definition of solid waste
based on its conclusion that Congress "clearly and unambiguously" in-
tended to limit the definition of solid waste (and therefore EPA's regula-
tory authority) to materials that were discarded by being disposed of,
abandoned, or thrown away. t 76
168. 824 F.2d at 1188.
169. Id. at 1190.
170. Id. at 1188.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1191-92.
173. Id. at 1191 (emphasis added by court) (citing H.R. REP. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 46, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5605).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1191-92.
176. The court stated that it was:
constrained to conclude that, in light of the language and structure of RCRA, the
problems animating Congress to enact it, and the relevant portions of the legislative
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Judge Mikva, writing in dissent, would have upheld EPA's interpre-
tation of the statute based on principles of judicial deference to an
agency's interpretation of a statute it is responsible for implementing. 77
Reviewing the same language and legislative history as the majority, the
dissent concluded that RCRA's language was sufficiently ambiguous,
and EPA's interpretation sufficiently reasonable, to require the court,
under the Chevron test, to uphold EPA's definition of solid waste.17 8
A. Problems with the Court's Analysis
Although there is something intuitively obvious in the court's con-
clusion that solid waste is limited to materials that have been disposed of,
abandoned, or thrown away, there is unfortunately nothing that is either
intuitive or obvious about RCRA or EPA's regulations. While the ma-
jority's analysis disproves its own statement that Congress' intent was
"unambiguous," 179 there are deeper flaws in the court's analysis.
1. The Court Failed to Address EPA's Rationale for Regulating
Secondary Materials as Solid Waste
The court never indicated that it understood EPA's rationale for
regulating recyclable materials as solid waste. Rather, in abstract fash-
ion, the court characterized the issue as whether RCRA's definition of
"wastes" includes materials that have not been "discarded" and con-
cluded that materials that are part of an ongoing manufacturing process
are not discarded in the "ordinary" sense of the word.' 80 EPA regula-
tions, however, already purport to exempt materials that are part of an
ongoing production process from the definition of solid waste.' 8 ' EPA
has applied this exemption narrowly, but the court failed to analyze, or
to try to understand, the rationale behind EPA's regulations.
This lack of understanding is best illustrated by the court's discus-
sion of the petroleum and mining wastes at issue in the case. Although
the court identified the petroleum and mining practices that were regu-
lated, it did not discuss the basis for regulation. EPA defined the petro-
leum wastes as RCRA wastes because they were secondary materials
used to produce a fuel.'8 2 In general, EPA regulates the use of secondary
history, Congress clearly and unambiguously expressed its intent that "solid waste"
(and therefore EPA's regulatory authority) be limited to materials that are "dis-
carded" by virtue of being disposed of, abandoned, or thrown away.
Id. at 1193.
177. Id. at 1194-95.
178. Id. at 1196-97.
179. Compare id. at 1182 (stating the rule that deference is due the agency only where
statutory language is unambiguous) with id. at 1192 (saying that RCRA is ambiguous).
180. Id. at 1185-86.
181. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(8) (1988).
182. In its 1988 proposal, EPA described the basis for regulating these wastes:
Petroleum refineries often take oil-bearing by-products and sludges from the refining
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materials to produce fuels to avoid the burning of hazardous wastes as a
surrogate for proper incineration. 8 3 Whatever one may think of EPA's
questionable application of this purpose in the context of ongoing
processing at a petroleum refinery, the court never addressed the
Agency's rationale. 8 4
More troubling is the court's failure to address the reason why EPA
included mining wastes under its RCRA regulations. EPA classified
these materials as solid waste because they were listed byproducts or
sludges, which did not satisfy the criteria for "closed-loop" exclusions in
ongoing production processes.18 5 Apparently, the mining wastes were
not reintroduced into the original production process, a crucial element
of the EPA exclusion.18 6
The proper issue for the court to address was whether EPA's nar-
row classification of ongoing production processes was a permissible con-
struction of RCRA.187  Indeed, most of the court's discussion is
process, and return these materials, either by direct reinsertion into the petroleum
refining process or (more normally) return to an oil recovery system ("slop oil") after
which recovered oils are returned to the petroleum refining process. These by-prod-
ucts and sludges are sometimes hazardous (for example, API separator sludge and
DAF Float from petroleum refining, both listed hazardous wastes, are sometimes
recycled in this way), and, if so, would be classified as hazardous waste under the
Agency's existing rules because they are used to produce fuels.
Amendments to Definition, supra note 81, at 520.
183. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c)(2) (1988); see also Original Definition, supra note 8, at 618.
184. If these materials, otherwise not wastes because part of an ongoing production pro-
cess, are defined as wastes solely because they are being used to produce a fuel, then EPA's
classification is difficult to justify. Part of EPA's basic rationale for defining materials as waste
has been to distinguish materials that are part of a production process. See Amendments to
Definition, supra note 81, at 521. The use of a secondary material to produce a fuel is relevant
to classification of a waste, see infra notes 235-37 and accompanying text, but only if the
material has ceased to be used within the ongoing process. See Amendments to Definition,
supra note 81, at 522. This problem may, however, be limited to the petroleum refining indus-
try. It is hard to imagine a situation, other than a petroleum refinery, where a material is part
of the ongoing production process and is being used to produce a fuel.
185. See generally 824 F.2d at 1180-81 & n.3.
186. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(e)(1) (1988). The Agency described the regulation of these wastes
as follows:
The primary smelting industries also frequently recover additional metal values
from sludges and by-products generated in the primary smelting process. This recov-
ery can involve direct return to the smelting process, or recovery in other unit opera-
tions .... To the extent these activities involve sludges and by-products on the lists
of hazardous wastes from specific and non-specific sources.., and the activity occurs
outside of a closed-loop reclamation system, they are classified as solid wastes under
the existing EPA rules the court considered in its decision.
Amendments to Definition, supra note 81, at 520.
Although it was not discussed, the primary smelting industries apparently were not eligi-
ble for the closed-loop variances for materials that are reclaimed. At no point did the court
indicate that it understood the availability of a potential variance. See 40 C.F.R. § 260.30
(1988) ("Variances from Classification as a Solid Waste"). This case is even more remarkable
than it appears if the court is suggesting that an administrative agency may not handle margi-
nal cases by means of a variance rather than through the basic definition.
187. See Original Definition, supra note 8, at 639.
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irrelevant since EPA agrees with the court's basic conclusion that materi-
als that are still part of an ongoing process are not wastes.18 8
It is one thing to ask, in the abstract, whether Congress intended
RCRA to apply to materials that do not fall within the ordinary meaning
of discarded. It is quite another to consider whether EPA's regulatory
construction (that only materials returned as feedstock to the original
production process are part of an ongoing production process) is a legiti-
mate exercise of agency discretion. By defining the issue as it did, the
court reflected a lack of understanding of EPA's position and a disregard
for EPA's primary responsibility to establish a regulatory program under
RCRA.189
2. Ambiguity in the Scope of the Court's Holding
Because the majority in American Mining Congress failed to discuss
EPA's construction of the meaning of "discarded," it is difficult to assess
the significance of the court's opinion on the validity of the Agency's
basic interpretation. Although the majority announced that "solid
wastes" were limited to materials that were "truly" discarded, 90 the
opinion only appears to preclude EPA's regulation of materials that are
part of a continuous, ongoing industrial operation.191
If the opinion is read narrowly, as prohibiting EPA from regulating
certain materials that are part of an "ongoing" industrial operation, its
effect may be limited. Through its exclusions and variances, EPA al-
ready exempts most of these materials. 92 Indeed, EPA has construed
American Mining Congress in this fashion and proposed rather modest
amendments to its regulations in response to the opinion. 93
Although the specific holding of the case is narrow, the court's ra-
tionale for its holding is quite broad. Ultimately, the court suggests that
EPA is limited to regulating materials that satisfy some "plain-English
meaning" definition of discarded materials. 194 Not surprisingly, this am-
biguity has led to a dispute over the changes EPA must make to respond
188. See Amendments to Definition, supra note 81, at 520 ("For the most part, EPA's
existing rules already distinguish between on-going, in-house types of manufacturing activities
and waste management. Indeed, this was the Agency's avowed purpose .....
189. See 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
190. 824 F.2d at 1192.
191. Id. at 1181 n.3. Although the court characterized petitioners' contention as whether
"EPA's authority under RCRA is limited to controlling materials that are discarded or in-
tended for discard," the court also characterized the argument as whether "EPA's reuse and
recycle rules, as applied to inprocess secondary materials, regulate materials that have not been
discarded, and therefore exceed EPA's jurisdiction." Id. at 1180 (emphasis both omitted and
added).
192. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 260.30-.33, 261.4 (1988).
193. See infra notes 200-11 and accompanying text.
194. 824 F.2d at 1184.
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to the court's holding. 95 The extent to which the court will apply this
rationale to limit EPA regulation of materials that are recycled in ways
other than through reuse in ongoing industrial processes remains to be
seen.
3. The Court's Rationale is Essentially Useless in Constructing a
Workable Regulatory Definition of Solid Waste
The court's failure to define clearly the term "discarded" has sent
EPA back to the drawing board with as useless a set of directions as that
provided by Congress in its statutory definition of solid wastes. 96 Con-
trary to the court's statement, the definition of discarded is not obvious
and does require the application of agency expertise. 9 7 Many questions
remain. Are waste oils used as dust suppressants obviously discarded?
Are waste oils burned for fuel in residential boilers obviously discarded?
Under the court's analysis, what is one to conclude about spent material
sent to a recycler for recovery of valuable materials or for regeneration?
Are these secondary materials any more obviously discarded than mater-
ials reprocessed onsite at the original generating industry? 98 Although
there is much to criticize about the EPA regulations, 99 the court's con-
clusion contributes little to devising a workable program to accomplish
the somewhat contradictory goals of regulating environmentally destruc-
tive waste and promoting recycling.
Ultimately, the court's analysis merely restates the problem. It is as
difficult to separate legitimate reuse and recycling from "sham" recycling
under the court's approach as it is under the Agency's. Unless EPA is
prepared to give up virtually all regulatory control over anything that
purports to be recycling, the opinion is useless as a guide to the Agency.
B. EPA's Proposal in Response to American Mining Congress
In response to American Mining Congress, EPA proposed revisions
to its definition of solid waste. 2° Construing the opinion narrowly to
apply only to materials that are part of an ongoing industrial process,
EPA has claimed that "manufacturing processes (or other types of re-
cycling) involving an element of discard which do not involve secondary
materials passing through a continuous, ongoing manufacturing process
195. See infra note 202.
196. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1982).
197. 824 F.2d at 1184 & n.7.
198. The court does suggest that some "recycling" may involve wastes that are within the
jurisdiction of RCRA. For example, the court characterizes a "pesticide drum being reused as
a trash container," id. at 1191 n.20, as a "clear example[] of waste disposal." Id. at 1191; see
also id. at 1180.
199. See infra notes 212-67 and accompanying text.
200. Amendments to Definition, supra note 81, at 519.
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remain within the Agency's jurisdiction. ' 20 ' EPA asserts that the opin-
ion requires only modest changes because "[flor the most part, EPA's
existing rules already distinguish between ongoing, in-house types of
manufacturing activities and waste management. '20 2
EPA's proposal makes three basic changes. First, it would specifi-
cally exclude from regulation certain "oil bearing hazardous secondary
materials from petroleum refining. ' 20 3 To be eligible for the exclusion,
the oil-bearing residue must be generated onsite and reinserted into the
onsite refining process as part of an ongoing and continuous process not
characterized by any elements of discard.20 4
Second, EPA has proposed to promulgate the criteria it will use to
decide which sludges and byproducts will be listed as "hazardous
waste. '20 5 EPA believes that by explicitly articulating its criteria, it can
justify the regulations under the holding in American Mining Congress.206
The proposed regulation states that "[t]he ultimate object in applying
these factors is to determine whether the sludges or by-products are be-
ing utilized in ongoing, continuous manufacturing processes. ' 2 7
The proposed criteria include determining (1) whether the material,
on an industry-wide basis, is "typically" recycled rather than disposed of,
(2) whether the material is replacing a raw material when it is reclaimed,
(3) whether the reclamation is closely related to the principal activity of
the reclamation facility, and (4) whether the material is stored prior to
201. Id. at 520.
202. Id. As discussed above, this seems to be a proper reading of American Mining Con-
gress. If there is any incongruity in stating that American Mining Congress requires only mod-
est changes in EPA's regulations, it stems from the court's failure to understand the basis and
structure of EPA's regulations.
Petitioners, however, take a somewhat different view. After EPA published its proposal
in response to the opinion, petitioners actually filed a motion with the court seeking to have the
opinion "enforced" and claiming that the Agency was in contempt of court. Petitioners
claimed that the Agency was attempting to "circumvent the judicial process" and had "bla-
tantly disregarded" the court's opinion. 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 203 (June 10, 1988). The court
denied this motion. 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 966 (Sept. 9, 1988).
203. Amendments to Definition, supra note 81, at 529.
204. Id. at 525. The proposed new portions of 40 C.F.R. § 261.4 ("Exclusions") state:
(9) Oil-bearing hazardous secondary materials from petroleum refining which are
converted into petroleum coke at the same facility at which such materials are gener-
ated, provided the materials are not stored in a manner involving placement on the
land, or accumulated speculatively, before being so recycled. (However, coke pro-
duced from such recycling is not a solid waste.)
(10) Oil-bearing hazardous secondary materials from petroleum refining that are
generated on site and reinserted into the petroleum refining process along with nor-
mal process streams, provided that the materials are not stored in a manner involving
placement on the land, or accumulated speculatively, before being so recycled. (Fu-
els produced from such recycling are not solid wastes.)
Amendments to Definition, supra note 81, at 529 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(9),
(10)).
205. Id. at 521.
206. Id. at 520-21, 526.
207. Id. at 529 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c)(3)(ii)).
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reclamation in a manner designed to minimize loss. 20 8 The proposed reg-
ulation also provides a self-implementing variance for individual facilities
reclaiming listed sludges and byproducts if the facility can demonstrate
that the material is part of an ongoing continuous industrial process.
20 9
Third, the proposal creates a new "exclusion" that is applicable to
secondary materials that are reclaimed before reinsertion into the origi-
nal processes from which they were generated. 21 0 These materials would
be excluded if the entire reclamation process is enclosed by means of
pipes or other enclosed conveyances, the reclamation does not involve
long-term storage or burning, and the reclaimed materials are not used as
a fuel or applied to the land.2 '1 This proposal essentially extends the
closed-loop exclusion to certain reclamation activities that otherwise
would have been eligible only for a variance.
IV
RETHINKING THE REGULATION OF RECYCLABLE MATERIALS
So where are we? EPA has promulgated a confused and somewhat
arbitrary definition of solid waste. The D.C. Circuit has produced a lim-
ited and inadequate analysis of the issue. You are undoubtedly confused.
Perhaps it is time to step back and reconsider some of the basic
issues relevant to devising an appropriate regulatory definition of solid
waste. EPA's approach to regulating recyclable materials is basically
sound; however, there are three ways by which the Agency could im-
prove its regulations. First, EPA must articulate a consistent and under-
standable rationale for classifying materials as solid waste. Second, EPA
should reconsider the need for some of its requirements in light of other
statutory programs. Third, EPA should rewrite and restructure its regu-
lations to make them more intelligible.
A. The Rationale for Classifying Materials as Solid Wastes
EPA has never clearly stated its rationale for classifying recyclable
materials as solid waste. It has acknowledged that its authority does not
extend to certain types of recycling activities "that are shown to be very
similar to normal production operations or to normal uses of commercial
products."2 1 2 Although the regulations contain a variety of criteria for
determining whether a material is a waste,2 13 these criteria are not com-
208. Id. at 529 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c)(3)(i)).
209. Id.
210. See id. at 527-28.
211. Id. at 529 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(8)). The coverage of the closed-loop
exclusion is discussed supra note 113 and accompanying text.
212. Original Definition, supra note 8, at 617 (emphasis added).
213. See, e.g., infra note 264 for a list of seven different criteria, exclusions, and variances
that EPA has promulgated or proposed, all of which purport to identify whether a material is
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pletely consistent. Some focus on whether a material is being used as an
"essential part" of an ongoing production process, 214 but others, such as
the criteria for designating materials as "inherently waste-like," focus on
the environmental harm from recycling the material.2 1 5 At times EPA
has described the basis for defining solid waste as searching for an "ele-
ment of discard. '2 16
Although the Agency has not stated it in these terms, the regula-
tions appear to define solid waste as any: (i) "secondary material, '2 17 (ii)
that is recycled in a manner constituting "hazardous waste disposal, stor-
age or treatment, '21 8 and (iii) that is not part of an "ongoing commercial
process. ' ' 219 The basis for excluding materials that are part of an ongo-
ing commercial process seems clear. If American Mining Congress means
anything, it is that materials cannot be wastes as long as they continue to
be part of an ongoing manufacturing process.220 EPA has always recog-
nized this principle, but has used a narrow definition of ongoing manu-
facturing processes that includes only processing or reclamation through
a physically closed system, or through the reintroduction of the material
into the primary production process. 22' Clearly, American Mining Con-
gress adopted a more liberal definition of what an ongoing manufacturing
process is under RCRA. 222 EPA's proposed changes expand the exclu-
sion slightly, but it is unclear whether this will satisfy the court.
Furthermore, EPA has never explained why secondary materials re-
used in a manner constituting hazardous waste disposal, storage, or treat-
ment constitute wastes. Although the concept of "secondary materials"
is central to its definition, EPA has not defined the term. Rather, the
Agency has stated circularly that a secondary material is a material that
"potentially can be a solid and hazardous waste when recycled. '223
Moreover, although it has defined specific types of secondary materials,
EPA has never stated why these materials are regulated as RCRA
wastes224 or why the type of recycling activity is relevant to whether a
material is classified as a solid waste.
being used as part of an ongoing commercial process.
214. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 260.31(b) (1988).
215. See id. § 261.2(d); see also Original Definition, supra note 8, at 637.
216. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Amendments to Defini-
tion, supra note 81, at 520-21, 527.
217. See Original Definition, supra note 8, at 616 n.4.
218. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(c)(2)(i) (1988).
219. See Amendments to Definition, supra note 81, at 520.
220. See id.
221. See Original Definition, supra note 8, at 639.
222. See 824 F.2d at 1186.
223. Original Definition, supra note 8, at 616 n.4.
224. All of the secondary materials share the characteristic of not being intentionally pro-
duced for the use to which they are put, and there is a certain intuitive logic to classifying
materials not deliberately produced as commercial products as wastes. See infra notes 229-32
and accompanying text. Indeed, regardless of the uses that may be found for them, these
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Despite EPA's failure to explain the basic rationale for its regula-
tions, its definition of solid waste can be justified in economic terms.
Both the classification of secondary materials and the methods of re-
cycling are relevant in assessing whether a material has economic
"value" to society. Ultimately, it is the concept of "value" that distin-
guishes a waste from a product: products have some economic value in
society, but wastes do not.
EPA has acknowledged that "value" is a relevant criteria for classi-
fying a material as a waste, and it had considered a definition of solid
waste based in part on whether a recycler had paid or given value for the
materials. 225 Although EPA felt this approach had an "intuitive ap-
peal," it ultimately rejected the definition based largely on the difficulty
of enforcement. 226
Focusing on value, however, remains the correct approach to take in
defining solid waste. The problem with EPA's earlier notion was that its
definition of whether a material had economic value was too narrow.227
Recyclable materials may have "value" even if the recycler is paid to take
the materials. If, for example, a waste costs forty dollars a ton to dispose
of conventionally and the generator would give a recycler thirty dollars
to recycle the material, it would be economically appropriate, under cer-
tain conditions, to encourage that recycling. Although in such a case the
value comes in part from avoiding the cost of disposal, the recyclable
material, as opposed to a waste that cannot be recycled, still has some
economic value to society.228
EPA's current definition already identifies the broader factors rele-
vant to determining whether a material has economic value. It does this
implicitly by classifying materials that are not produced in response to
market demand (and that gain value as commodities by imposing on so-
ciety externalities that RCRA was intended to prevent) as wastes. 229
secondary materials are generally treated by industry as wastes. See generally Proposed Stan-
dards, supra note 36, at 14,476 n.7. In many ways, by regulating recycled secondary materials
as wastes, EPA is resurrecting, in revised form, its coverage of materials that "sometimes are
discarded." See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
225. See Proposed Standards, supra note 36, at 14,478-81.
226. The Agency recognized the "intuitive appeal" of relying on payment as an indication
of whether a material is a waste, but it also recognized a number of problems with relying on
payment when defining whether a material is a waste. Exempting materials if a recycler has
paid for them would create difficult enforcement problems, discourage recyclers from ac-
cepting some small quantities of materials that they would not otherwise buy, and not ensure
that the materials were actually recycled. See id.
227. See generally id. at 14,475.
228. See id. at 14,478.
229. An important concern of environmental economics is the analysis of externalities.
"Externalities occur when the actions of one person affect the well-being of other persons and
there is no compensating market transaction between the persons." Rooney, Environmental
Economics, 1 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 47, 48 n.l (1980).
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Viewed this way, EPA's current approach is a rational method that pre-
sumptively classifies materials as wastes based on value.
1. Responsiveness to Market Demand
One significant characteristic that can be used conceptually to dis-
tinguish wastes from products is whether their production is influenced
by demand. 230 The "market" theoretically determines the efficient level
of production of goods based on supply and demand. Goods are inten-
tionally produced based on a judgment that a market exists, and it is the
responsiveness of production to demand that leads to an efficient level of
output of a product.23 1
In contrast, wastes are the unintended or unwanted consequence of
commercial activity. Wastes are not deliberately produced to satisfy a
perceived demand.232 The secondary materials that EPA regulates as po-
tential solid wastes clearly have this characteristic. Spent materials,
sludges, and byproducts are not intentionally generated for use in re-
cycling: a generator does not alter its production process to increase the
output of these materials relative to the output of its basic product.
Although EPA does not state it this way, this seems to be the rationale
underlying the treatment of secondary materials as a potential solid
wastes. It follows, then, that when a material is intentionally produced
at the expense of the basic product, the generator should be able to
demonstrate that the material is a coproduct and not a waste.
2. Imposing Externalities by Recycling
Because the cost of hazardous waste disposal may be high, a genera-
tor has an incentive to create a "recycling" operation whose value comes
not from the product produced by recycling, but from the ability to avoid
the costs of proper disposal. Recycling undertaken to avoid disposal
costs, however, is not a "sham." Recycling materials at a cost lower than
conventional disposal may be an economically valuable alternative. Re-
cyclable materials have value in this sense, however, only if that value
does not impose externalized costs on society.2 33
230. For a general discussion of supply, demand, and market equilibrium, see P. SAMUEL-
SON, ECONOMICS 55-67 (8th ed. 1970).
231. See id.
232. The production of wastes also responds to economic factors, largely through the legal
liabilities that stem from their production. Disposal requirements imposed through RCRA
raise the costs associated with the production of wastes and act as a disincentive to their pro-
duction. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922, 6924 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Although RCRA directly
requires plans for waste minimization (id. § 6922(b)), it probably accomplishes this goal indi-
rectly through increasing costs and liabilities in the production of wastes.
233. See, e.g., A. KNEESE, R. AYRES & R. D'ARGE, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT: A MATERIALS BALANCE APPROACH 3 (1970); Fisher & Peterson, The Environment in
Economics, 14 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1, 4 (1976); Rooney, supra note 229, at 48 n.7. The
correction of the market failure that led to the "externalities" is one basic rationale for govern-
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One argument for defining solid waste broadly under RCRA is that
this internalizes the potential social costs that could result from a broad
range of activities leading to health and environmental problems through
improper disposal. 23 4 By regulating these material and activities, RCRA
forces the producer to bear the full costs of production including proper
disposal. If a generator, however, can avoid the costs of disposal simply
by labeling an operation as "recycling," even where the activity creates
environmental problems similar to those caused by improper disposal,
then the value of recycling comes from a shell game. The generator
avoids the internalized costs of regulation and, instead, imposes the costs
on society. Thus, materials whose value comes from avoiding disposal
costs should be classified as wastes if recycling these materials creates the
types of environmental problems and risks that RCRA was designed to
avoid.
EPA's regulations implicitly recognize the importance of environ-
mental values by classifying materials that are recycled in a manner con-
stituting hazardous waste disposal, storage, or treatment as wastes.235
Secondary materials that are recycled by burning, application to land, or
long-term storage presumptively create the same environmental
problems addressed by RCRA incineration and land disposal regula-
tions.236 To a more limited extent, as discussed below, this is also true of
recycling by reclamation. 237 The materials used in reclamation activities
also may not have true value to society if their primary value arises from
avoiding the costs of conventional disposal.
Thus, EPA's definition of waste focuses on those materials and
processes whose production is not subject to market forces and whose use
generates externalities that the hazardous waste disposal system is
designed to avoid. Taken together, these factors establish the basic prin-
ment intervention and regulation. See, e.g., R. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FI-
NANCE 7 (1959).
234. Although most would agree that internalization of social costs is both a goal and
rationale for environmental regulation, there is a larger debate as to whether the extent of
environmental regulation should be governed by criteria of market efficiency. Compare W.
BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION (1974) with Sagoff,
Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393 (1983).
To argue that it is appropriate to focus on market efficiency criteria in defining wastes
under RCRA says nothing about the propriety of defining the scope of environmental regula-
tion in terms of market efficiency. Market criteria must be used in this case because Congress
tied RCRA's jurisdiction to a concept-waste-that is essentially economic in nature. See
supra note 3 and accompanying text.
235. See Original Definition, supra note 8, at 618.
236. See generally id. at 627-28.
237. The issue of reclamation is somewhat more complicated. Goods produced from re-
claimed materials generally are not treated as wastes. EPA treats secondary materials destined
for reclamation as wastes only until they are actually introduced into the reclamation process.
See Proposed Standards, supra note 36, at 14,486. As discussed below, the environmental
externalities EPA is attempting to avoid may, in most cases, not be an appropriate subject for
regulation under RCRA. See infra note 257.
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ciples that justify EPA's presumptive classification of secondary materi-
als recycled in methods constituting hazardous waste 'disposal, storage,
or treatment as solid wastes. 238 In individual cases a generator may
claim that these materials are not wastes. If so, a unified variance mecha-
nism is the appropriate method to deal with these cases.
B. Regulation of Reclamation Activities
In adopting a regulatory program for recyclable materials, EPA
must reconcile RCRA's objective of preventing environmental harm with
its objective of encouraging recycling. Wher6 recycling is by land appli-
cation, incineration, or long-term storage, stringent regulation is war-
ranted because these practices pose direct environmental threats
equivalent to hazardous waste disposal practices.
Reclamation activities, however, are different. In most cases, EPA
regulates neither the product produced by reclamation nor the reclama-
tion process itself. In fact, if the reclaimer does not store materials onsite
prior to reclamation, the regulations merely require that the reclaimer
satisfy certain notification requirements and manifest the wastes during
transport. 239 In its 1983 proposal, EPA largely exempted onsite reclama-
tion from regulation. 24° In its final regulation, however, EPA concluded
that exempting such reclamation would create too great an environmen-
tal risk from improper storage. 24 1
EPA provided that if materials are "temporarily" stored onsite prior
to reclamation, the reclamation facility not only must manifest the
wastes, it also must obtain a hazardous waste permit.242 To obtain a
permit, the facility must prepare storage plans and satisfy financial re-
sponsibility requirements for closure and personal injury insurance. 243
Much of the complexity of the regulations stem from EPA's deci-
sion to regulate reclamation activities. This decision led it to create, for
example, the distinction between the "closed-loop recycling exemption,"
the "closed-loop" variance, and the proposed new "closed-loop reclama-
tion exemption. '244
EPA's decision to regulate "temporary" storage at reclamation fa-
cilities has other costs in addition to regulatory complexity. Under
RCRA, new facilities generally are not authorized to begin operating un-
til they have received a final permit, 245 a process that often takes consid-
238. See supra note 140.
239. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
240. See Proposed Standards, supra note 36, at 14,488.
241. See Original Definition, supra note 8, at 637-40.
242. 40 C.F.R. § 261.6 (1988).
243. Id.
244. See Original Definition, supra note 8, at 639.
245. Only "interim status" facilities may operate pending receipt of a final permit. Interim
status is available only to facilities that were in existence on November 19, 1980 or "in exist-
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erable time. Moreover, the need for a permit creates another significant
obstacle to the construction of new reclamation facilities; the financial
responsibility provision requires facilities to provide financial assurances
of over a million dollars. 24 6
Legitimate reclamation, however, should be encouraged. Given that
EPA regulates neither the product nor the process of reclamation, the
Agency should reconsider what it is achieving through its regulatory
requirements.
EPA's primary concern seems to be the potential for improper stor-
age and handling of recyclable materials at reclamation facilities, a posi-
tion it has justified based on past environmental incidents. 247 What EPA
seems to have ignored is that other environmental statutes, adopted in
most cases after these damage incidents occurred, lessen the need to reg-
ulate these facilities under RCRA.
The most important of these statutes is the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response Compensation and Liability Act, known as CERCLA
or Superfund.2 48 CERCLA imposes liability on a facility for the cost of
cleanup of all hazardous substances, not just wastes, that are released
into the environment. 249 Moreover, the owners and operators of recla-
mation facilities are subject to liability for the release of a hazardous sub-
stance even if it is not a waste under RCRA. 250
Furthermore, the recently adopted Emergency Planning and Com-
munity Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), Title III of the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act, requires industrial facilities to
inventory and to report publicly on the quantities of hazardous sub-
stances that are present at their site. 25 1 Although EPCRA does not spe-
ence on the effective date of statutory or regulatory changes under [RCRA] that render the
facility subject to the requirement to have a permit." 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986). Interim status facilities, including those that directly dispose of hazardous wastes, may
operate under a set of interim regulatory requirements until their permit is processed. See 40
C.F.R. § 265.1 (1988).
246. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.140-.151 (1988).
247. See Proposed Standards, supra note 36, at 14,474.
248. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
249. Id. § 9607.
250. Id. See generally ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 16, § 13.06; D. STEVER, LAW OF
CHEMICAL REGULATION AND HAZARDOUS WASTE (1986).
251. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) was
adopted as part of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986. Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, §§ 300-330 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (Supp. IV 1986)).
The Act is a nightmarish mix of planning and notification requirements. One part of the Act
requires the establishment of state and local emergency response commissions. 42 U.S.C.
§ 11001 (Supp. IV 1986).
Additionally, EPCRA imposes requirements on industrial facilities where there are haz-
ardous chemicals. The nature of the requirements depends on the classification of the chemi-
cal, i.e., whether they have been classed by EPA as "extremely hazardous substances," and
the quantities of chemicals at the facility. Id. § 11004. The requirements include preparing
chemical inventories, reporting to the local emergency response committee, and reporting the
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cifically mandate proper storage, it does create significant incentives to
properly handle hazardous materials, and it is broadly applicable to all
hazardous substances. 252
The Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA)253 may also help control
recyclable materials. TSCA authorizes EPA to regulate or even to pro-
hibit the introduction of new chemical substances, as well as significant
new uses of substances, that may pose an unreasonable risk to human
health or the environment2 54
Finally, RCRA itself applies to any "waste" material that is gener-
ated at the reclamation facility. 25 5 As with any other industrial facility, a
reclamation facility would be classed as a generator if it produced any
hazardous waste in its reclamation process. 256
In light of these statutes, it is questionable whether the incremental
protection afforded by the regulations justifies the added costs they im-
pose. 257 EPA's regulations already protect against the direct and more
substantial environmental risks of other forms of recycling activities in-
cluding uses constituting disposal, burning for energy recovery, and spec-
ulative accumulation. 258 Its regulation of reclamation activities targets
only short-term storage at the cost of creating both greater regulatory
complexity and disincentives to reclamation.
facility's releases of "toxic chemicals" annually. See H.R. REP. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2835. See generally ENVTL. L.
INST., supra note 16, § 13.07.
252. See generally ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 16, § 13.07(l)-(2).
253. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
254. See generally D. STEVER, supra note 250, §§ 2.01-.02.
255. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 6903 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
256. See 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 (1988).
257. EPA's regulations for reclamation facilities also require that they satisfy certain fi-
nancial responsibility requirements both to ensure cleanup in the event of a release and to
compensate any victims of a release. 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.140-.151 (1988). CERCLA does im-
pose liability for cleanup, although it does not ensure that there are resources to satisfy that
liability. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). But neither CERCLA, nor any other
related environmental statute, imposes liability for compensation to persons injured from the
release. The question arises whether EPA is justified in requiring insurance from reclamation
facilities when there is no comparable requirement for other industrial facilities.
Although such insurance is certainly a good idea, it is worth asking whether RCRA was
intended to be used to create a personal injury compensation system for reclamation processes
that are not themselves environmentally harmful and are similar to other types of industrial
processes that do not require compensation. It is also worth noting that EPA does not impose
this requirement on facilities that reclaim materials without first storing them. See supra note
140.
Finally, EPA requires a manifest system that ensures that materials are tracked from their
point of generation to their place of reclamation. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.40-.44, 263.20-.22,
264.70-.77 (1988). EPA also imposes this requirement on materials that are not stored prior to
reclamation. This control of recyclable materials is warranted because of the often marginal
market value of these materials (which increases the likelihood. of illegal dumping), the minor
cost of the control, and the large environmental threat stemming from the particular charac-
teristics of recyclable materials.
258. See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
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EPA should reconsider its regulatory treatment of reclamation. The
Agency should classify all secondary materials that are reclaimed as
wastes, but limit the regulatory requirements to notification and mani-
festing, whether the materials are stored onsite or not. This change
would ensure that the materials are subject to control, focusing govern-
ment and public attention on the facility and minimizing the threat of
midnight dumping, but is not so onerous that legitimate reclamation ac-
tivities are made uneconomical.
This change also would allow EPA to simplify its definition of solid
waste by eliminating distinctions based on the type of material that is
reclaimed. 259 Any generator or recycler would still be entitled to claim
that her material was not a waste and to seek a variance. However, given
the minor regulatory consequences of being classified as a waste, it is
unlikely that this would occur frequently. 26°
C. Simplifying the Regulatory Scheme
If a regulatory system leaves the regulated community confused, the
costs of the system will be increased and its effectiveness decreased. As
should be obvious, EPA has created a system that is enormously compli-
cated and more confusing than necessary. Because part of the problem
arises from the structure of the regulations themselves, this confusion can
be minimized.
First, EPA could restructure the basic definition of solid wastes.
EPA should simply define solid wastes as "secondary materials that are
reused or recycled in a manner constituting hazardous waste disposal,
storage or treatment." This definition would reflect the basis of EPA's
decision to treat the material as waste.
As part of this change EPA must define "secondary materials." '26'
The Agency should define them as including the existing specified types
of material, but the definition itself should contain the exclusion, now
found at section 261.2(b), 262 for materials that are still a part of ongoing
commercial processes. The current definition confusingly includes
materials that are part of a commercial process, and then has a subse-
259. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
260. EPA could also provide that any material that is exempt from classification as a waste
automatically will be considered for regulation under TSCA as a new chemical or significant
new use. There is even less incentive for a facility in such a case to request to be moved from
the frying pan into the fire.
261. Similarly, EPA should define "hazardous waste disposal, storage, and treatment" as
including land application, incineration, speculative accumulation, and reclamation. By label-
ing only land application as "use constituting disposal," see Original Definition, supra note 8,
at 646, EPA obscures the point that all of these activities are subject to regulation as forms of
hazardous waste management.
262. The problems caused by using an independent set of exemptions, exclusions, and a
variance for such processes are discussed supra notes 114-29 and accompanying text.
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quent exclusion. This confusion is amplified when EPA has several in-
dependent provisions that act as exclusions from the classification as
solid waste. If EPA tied its regulatory definition of solid waste directly
to the concept of secondary materials (which by definition would not
include materials in an ongoing commercial process), the regulation
would be simpler and more rational on its face.
EPA could also eliminate the distinctions among materials that are
reclaimed. This would allow EPA to eliminate its "matrix" of materials
and uses. 26 3 All secondary materials that are reclaimed should be pre-
sumptively classified as solid wastes. Because, under the new definition,
secondary materials would not include materials used directly as prod-
ucts or materials in an ongoing production process, the regulation would
eliminate the need to distinguish among types of secondary materials.
Second, EPA needs to promulgate a single set of criteria for classify-
ing materials as solid wastes, to be used both for EPA determinations to
list materials as wastes and for decisions whether to grant variances from
classification as wastes. Currently EPA uses seven different sets of crite-
ria, exclusions, and variances, not all of which are consistent, to decide
how materials are classified and whether to grant variances. 264 There is
no reason to use different criteria to designate unlisted sludges, byprod-
ucts, and inherently waste-like materials and to grant variances from the
definition of solid waste.
Third, EPA should formally promulgate its criteria for determining
whether an activity is "sham" recycling. These criteria, now found in
portions of the preamble to the 1985 regulation 265 and in the 1988 propo-
sal, 2 6 6 should be included as part of the definition of reuse and recycling
now found in the regulation. 267
263. See supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
264. EPA has promulgated or proposed a variety of criteria that purport to identify
whether a material is part of an ongoing commercial process and hence not a waste. These
include: (1) determining whether secondary materials are eligible for an exclusion because
they are ingredients in the industrial process, are used directly as a product, or are part of an
ongoing commercial process, 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(e)(1) (1988); (2) determining whether unlisted
sludges and byproducts should be listed as wastes, Amendments to Definition, supra note 81;
(3) determining whether reclaimed secondary materials should be granted a variance from the
definition of solid waste because they are an "essential part" of an ongoing commercial pro-
cess, 40 C.F.R. § 260.31(b) (1988); (4) determining whether reclaimed sludges and byproducts
may be excluded from the definition of solid waste because they are physically connected to the
primary process and remain part of an ongoing, continuous manufacturing process, Amend-
ments to Definition, supra note 8 1; (5) whether a material should be designated as inherently
waste-like, 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(d) (1988); (6) exclusion of tank storage involving closed pipes, id.
§ 261.4(a)(8)(i); and (7) whatever criteria EPA used to conclude that spent sulfuric acid
processing and black liquor reclamation should be excluded from the definition of solid waste,
id. § 261.4(a)(6)-(7).
265. See Original Definition, supra note 8, at 617.




Finally, EPA should consolidate its substantive regulatory require-
ments for recyclable materials, now located primarily in 40 C.F.R. sec-
tion 261.6 and Part 266. EPA should simply combine the two sets of
requirements under Part 266 and establish a subpart that provides the
general requirements for recyclable materials and a subpart that specifi-




Congress gave EPA an impossible job when it required the Agency
to define solid waste under RCRA. Given the structure and contradic-
tory objectives of the statute and the complexity of the problem, there
was virtually no way that the Agency could have developed a clear, com-
prehensive, and rational definition.
Nonetheless, EPA has done a credible job with this difficult prob-
lem. Although the D.C. Circuit invalidated the regulation, the opinion is
attributable in part to the court's failure to understand the basis for
EPA's definition of materials as solid waste. The court's opinion only
requires minor modifications of the Agency's definition.
With some restructuring of the regulations, and by articulating its
basis for classifying materials as wastes, EPA can simplify its regulations
and make them more understandable. At a minimum, EPA should de-
fine the term "secondary materials" and codify the various exclusions
and variances from the definition of solid waste.
More fundamentally, however, the Agency should reconsider the
extent of its regulation of reclamation activities. Stringent controls on
recycling activities that pose direct environmental risks, such as burning,
land application, and long-term storage, are warranted. EPA's regula-
tion of reclamation apparently focuses only on the problems associated
with short-term storage. Given that other statutes address this issue, it is
questionable whether the added costs and complexity associated with
regulation under RCRA are warranted. Legitimate reclamation is the
type of recycling that should be encouraged the most.
The need to recycle hazardous wastes will continue to grow as the
difficulty and cost of waste disposal increase. EPA's definition of solid
waste will play a crucial role in encouraging recycling and ensuring that
"sham" recycling does not create more problems than it solves.
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